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COMMENT 
ICWA AND THE UNWED FATHER:  
A CONSTITUTIONAL CORRECTIVE 
TAYLOR DOW† 
The Indian Child Welfare Act provides important procedural protections 
for American Indian children, the parents of American Indian children, 
tribes, and Indian custodians in state court child custody proceedings. 
However, the Act excludes unwed fathers who have not “acknowledged or 
established” their paternity from its definition of “parent.” This effectively 
forecloses their ability to assert rights to their biological children under the 
Act. State courts have varied in their interpretations of “acknowledged or 
established,” with some incorporating their own laws and others adopting 
amorphous standards of reasonableness to determine whether an unwed 
father is a “parent” under the Act. The varying approaches adopted by state 
courts have highlighted the need for a more standardized interpretation of 
“acknowledged or established.” This Comment looks to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl for guidance. Though 
Adoptive Couple did not directly address the definition of “parent,” it 
appeared to invoke the Court’s “biology plus” jurisprudence while 
interpreting the Act. That case law etched the parameters of putative fathers’ 
paternal rights. This Comment incorporates the principles elucidated in 
those cases into “acknowledged or established” and posits that where 
enough time has passed for an unwed putative father to develop a 
constitutionally protectable relationship with his American Indian child, but 
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where that father has not met state law paternity requirements consistent 
with the Act, a state court should next consider whether the putative father, 
consistent with the Court’s biology plus jurisprudence, has developed a 
parent–child relationship sufficient for due process protections to attach. 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... #$#] 
I. THE BIRTH OF A MILESTONE: ICWA AND THE INDIAN FAMILY ......... #$#O 
A. A History of Suffering ............................................................... #$#P 
B. ICWA as Revolution: Shifting the Tide in Favor of Tribal 
Unification ............................................................................... #$W# 
II. SECTION #YX%(Y) AND ADOPTIVE COUPLE ................................. #$WO 
A. State Court Interpretation ....................................................... #$WO 
B. Section STUV(T) Following Adoptive Couple .......................... #$WY 
III. BIOLOGY PLUS AND THE UNWED FATHER ............................... #$%] 
IV. CONSIDERING STATE LAW INCORPORATION: A THRESHOLD ISSUE ... #$]] 
A. Paternity by State .................................................................... #$]] 
B. Rejecting Wholesale Incorporation ......................................... #$]O 
V. FASHIONING A STANDARD ......................................................... #$$# 
A. A Constitutional Imperative ..................................................... #$$# 
B. Articulating a Standard ........................................................... #$$] 
C. The Potential of a Biology Plus § STUV(T) ............................... #$OX 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. #$OW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Fatherhood, as a legal concept and social role, has eluded concrete legal 
definition.1 In the context of the Indian Child Welfare Act of #YP_ (ICWA),2 
that nebulous term has also bedeviled the unwed putative fathers to whom it 
applies,3 shrouding their attempts to assert rights under ICWA in 
indeterminacy. 
 
1 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective 
on Parents’ Rights, #] CARDOZO L. REV. #P]P, #P_]-_$ (#YY%) (“Father[hood] is filled with 
contradiction: . . . central to children’s experience yet increasingly transient; culturally 
defined by procreation but made real only through nurture; conceptually separate from 
mothering yet embedded in a network of interdependence; most valuable when offered as 
a gift, and yet often least valued when freely given.”). 
2 W$ U.S.C. §§ #YX#–#YO% (WX#W). 
3 In WX#O, the most recent year for which data is available, %Y._% of all children born in the 
United States were born to unmarried women. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OP 
NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. #, tbl.I-P (WX#_). 
 
WX#Y] ICWA and the Unwed Father #$#$ 
Enacted to shield American Indian families and tribes4 from the 
unwarranted removal of their children, ICWA provides procedural 
protections for American Indian children, their parents, tribes, and Indian 
custodians in state court child custody proceedings. But § #YX%(Y) of the 
Act excludes “unwed father[s] where paternity has not been acknowledged 
or established” from its definition of “parent.”5 ICWA, however, does not 
define “acknowledged or established.”6 This has led state courts to adopt 
their own, often conflicting, definitions.7 As a result, varying standards8 
for determining the paternity rights of unwed men with American Indian 
biological children have effectively undermined the uniformity which 
ICWA sought to impart in the child welfare proceedings of Indian 
children.9 The resulting confusion has highlighted the need for a uniform 
standard.10 
 
4 For purposes of consistency, all references to tribes in this Comment conform to the 
requirement of federal recognition embedded in ICWA’s definition of tribes. See W$ U.S.C. 
§ #YX%(_) (WX#W) (“‘Indian tribe’ means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or 
community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary 
[of the Interior] because of their status as Indians, including any Alaska Native village . . . .”). 
There are $P% federally recognized Indian tribes in the United States. Indian Entities Recognized 
by and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, _] Fed. Reg. 
#WXX (Jan. %X, WX#Y). 
5 W$ U.S.C. § #YX%(Y) (WX#W). 
6 In re S.A.M., PX% S.W.Wd OX%, OXP (Mo. Ct. App. #Y_O); see also Michael J. Dale, State 
Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Unstated Best Interest of the 
Child Test, WP GONZ. L. REV. %$%, %OX-O# (#YY#) (“How one establishes or acknowledges 
paternity is a difficult question to answer in its own right, even outside the context of the Act, 
and has produced substantial litigation and commentary.”); Kevin Heiner, Note, Are You My 
Father? Adopting a Federal Standard for Acknowledging or Establishing Paternity in State 
Court ICWA Proceedings, ##P COLUM. L. REV. W#$#, W#$% (WX#P) (noting that the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs’ WX#O ICWA guidelines did “nothing to resolve the ambiguity” surrounding these terms). 
7 Compare Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, YXO S.W.Wd #$W, #P% (Tex. App. #YY$) 
(adopting a state law standard for determining paternity for unwed fathers under § #YX%(Y)), 
with Michael J., Jr. v. Sr., P P.%d YOX, YO% (Ariz. Ct. App. WXXX) (rejecting an application of 
state law paternity establishment requirements under ICWA). 
8 See Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_, W$O (#Y_%) (“Rules governing . . . child custody are 
generally specified in statutory enactments that vary from State to State.”); June Carbone, The 
Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family Identity, O$ LA. L. REV. #WY$, 
#WY$ (WXX$) (“Not only are jurisdictions irreconcilably divided in their approach to parentage, 
decisions under settled law in a given county may not necessarily come out the same way.”). 
9 See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT GUIDELINES O 
(WX#O) (observing that the “disparate application of ICWA based on where the Indian child 
resides creates significant gaps in ICWA protections and is contrary to the uniform 
minimum Federal standards intended by Congress”). 
10 See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Beyond the Best Interests of the Tribe: The Indian Child 
Welfare Act and the Adoption of Indian Children, OO U. DET. L. REV. ]$#, ]$_-$Y (#Y_Y) (noting 
that “courts are having difficulty figuring out whether children of obvious Indian lineage are 
within the ICWA definition of ‘Indian children’ when their mothers are non-Indian and their 
fathers are Indians and tribal members, but do not meet the ICWA criteria for ‘parent’”). 
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This Comment proposes a constitutional solution to defining these 
terms. It rejects an application of § #YX%(Y) controlled entirely by state law. 
Rather, it posits that where an unmarried father fails to satisfy state law 
paternity establishment procedures consistent with the plain terms of the 
Act, a court should next look to the constitutional principles and standard 
established by the Supreme Court in a series of cases considering the 
parental rights of unwed fathers. That “biology plus” line of precedent 
grants unwed fathers parental rights when they have developed a 
substantial relationship with their children. Applying that precedent in 
conjunction with state law permits the Constitution to serve as a backstop 
where an unwed father of an Indian child may have failed to satisfy state 
law governing paternity but nonetheless created a constitutionally 
cognizable (and protectable) relationship with his child. 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of the treatment of 
American Indian children by the federal and state governments which led 
to ICWA’s enactment.11 It also provides an overview of ICWA provisions 
pertinent to the determination of paternity under the Act. Next, Part II 
surveys state courts’ conflicting rulings construing § #YX%(Y) and considers 
the impact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl should play in interpreting the provision moving forward. Part III 
describes the Court’s seminal biology plus cases and the shift they 
generated in paternal rights. Part IV then considers issues arising from state 
law incorporation after reviewing states’ methods for establishing paternity. 
Part V first sketches arguments in favor of employing biology plus 
principles, and then proceeds to describe those principles in greater detail. 
Finally, this Comment concludes by invoking those principles as a clarion 
call for their incorporation into § #YX%(Y) where unwed fathers do not 
satisfy state paternity requirements. 
I. THE BIRTH OF A MILESTONE: ICWA AND THE INDIAN FAMILY 
This Part traces the plight of American Indian children prior to the 
enactment of ICWA. It then analyzes ICWA’s provisions, considering in 
turn the protections they provide to Indian children, their parents, and 
Indian tribes and custodians in the quest to shield them from the 
indignities which led to the Act’s creation. 
 
11 See Lorie Graham, Reparations and the Indian Child Welfare Act, W$ LEGAL STUD. F. 
O#Y, OW] (WXX#) (“By the time ICWA was enacted into law in #YP_, one-third of all Native 
American children were being removed from their communities and families and placed in non-
Indian foster care, adoptive homes, and educational institutions.”). 
 
WX#Y] ICWA and the Unwed Father #$#P 
A. A History of Suffering 
Throughout modern history, Native peoples have often occupied a 
precarious position both within the American polity and the land which 
now constitutes the American union.12 Much of that precariousness often 
stemmed from concerted movements, spearheaded by the federal 
government, towards tribal destruction and forced assimilation of tribal 
members.13 At the inception of the American union, Indian tribes were 
viewed as separate, sovereign nations within the territorial limits of the 
United States.14 Their presence, in large part, shaped the framing of the 
Constitution,15 punctuated the powers of the federal government over 
Indian affairs,16 and limited the role of states in subjecting recalcitrant 
tribes to their laws.17 Tribes were treated like foreign nations, with 
treatymaking often dictating their relationships with the United States.18 
Those relationships, however, quickly eroded. Whereas Indian tribes 
initially commanded a fearful respect in the fledgling republic,19 that respect 
 
12 See United States v. Kagama, ##_ U.S. %P$, %_# (#__O) (“[T]he relation of the Indian 
tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since he Revolution, to 
the people of the United States has always been an anomalous one and of a complex 
character.”); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, %X U.S. ($ Pet.) #, #O (#_%#) (“[T]he relation of the 
Indians to the United States [was] marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no 
where else.”); FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW O]# (#Y_W ed.) (“Prior to 
#_P#, most Indians were considered to be members of separate political communities and not 
part of the ordinary body politic of the United States.”). Indian tribal members were not granted 
universal citizenship until #YW$. Citizenship Act of #YW], ch. W%%, ]% Stat. W$% (overturning Elk 
v. Wilkins, ##W U.S. Y] (#__]) (rejecting a claim of American citizenship by an Indian who was 
born on tribal lands but later renounced his tribal affiliation)). Prior to the universal grant of 
citizenship, the citizenship status of individual Indians “generally depended upon the effect of 
particular federal statutes or treaties upon her tribe . . . because the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . was held inapplicable to Indians who had been born under tribal authority.” 
Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, _# MINN. L. REV. %#, ]W n.]_ (#YYO). 
13 Supreme Court case law chronicled those movements with the panache of an obtuse 
bystander. See, e.g., Board of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Seber, %#_ U.S. PX$, P#$ (#Y]%) (“In the exercise 
of the war and treaty powers, the United States overcame the Indians and took possession of 
their lands, sometimes by force, leaving them an uneducated, helpless and dependent people 
. . . .”). 
14 Williams v. Lee, %$_ U.S. W#P, W#_ (#Y$Y). 
15 See generally Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, O% DUKE L.J. YYY (WX#]). 
16 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § _ (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes”). 
17 See Worcester v. Georgia, %# U.S. (O Pet.) $#$, $O# (#_%W) (invalidating a state law 
attempting to place restrictions on access to tribal lands). 
18 Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, $ AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. #%Y, #]# (#YPP). 
19 Worcester, %# U.S. at $]Y (“The early journals of congress exhibit the most anxious desire 
to conciliate the Indian nations.”); COLLIN CALLOWAY, THE INDIAN WORLD OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON #W (WX#_) (“[T]he power Natives wielded, the resistance they mounted, and the 
diplomatic influence they exerted exposed the limits of federal power, aggravated tensions 
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was replaced in short order by a diminished status amidst a feverish push for 
westward expansion and Indian subjugation.20 Indian tribes were demoted 
from fully sovereign entities to quasi-sovereign groups divested of their 
right to freely convey21 and exclusively police their lands,22 as well as any 
cogent claim to foreign status.23 Though tribal members had occupied vast 
expanses of the territorial United States,24 tribal property was relegated to 
reservations25 and subsequently parceled off to a disastrous effect26 in the 
name of dissolving tribes and integrating their members within the broader 
confines of states.27 
 
between federal and state governments, fueled divisions between East and West, and threatened 
to fragment the nation Washington was building.”). 
20 See Indian Removal Act, ch. #]_, ] Stat. ]## (#_%X) (codified as amended at W$ U.S.C. 
§ #P] (WX#W)) (authorizing the exchange of tribal lands within state borders for unoccupied 
land in formerly unorganized territories). 
21 See Johnson v. M’Intosh, W# U.S. (_ Wheat.) $]%, $Y# (#_W%) (holding that Indian 
inhabitants are occupants entitled to protection in the possession of their lands but incapable of 
transferring absolute title to others). 
22 United States v. Rogers, ]$ U.S. (] How.) $OP, $PW (#_$O) (“Congress may by law punish 
any offence committed [on tribal land], no matter whether the offender be a white man or an 
Indian.”). 
23 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, %X U.S. ($ Pet.) #, WX (#_%#) (“[A]n Indian tribe or nation 
within the United States is not a foreign state in the sense of the Constitution and cannot maintain 
an action in the courts of the United States.”). 
24 In the early years of the republic, Indian nations occupied at least half of the lands 
claimed by the states and North America’s other colonial inhabitants. See Brian Delay, 
Independent Indians and the U.S.-Mexican War, ##W AM. HIST. REV. %$, O_ (WXXP) (“By the 
early #_WXs, more than a dozen generations after Columbus, indigenous polities still 
controlled between half and three-quarters of the continental landmass claimed by the 
hemisphere’s remaining colonies and newly independent states.”). 
25 See Bethany R. Berger, “Power Over this Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian 
Law in United States v. Rogers, ]$ WM. & MARY L. REV. #Y$P, WX#P (WXX]) (“This policy 
concentrated tribes on small reservations and appointed Indian agents to ‘civilize’ them . . . .”). 
26 See Hodel v. Irving, ]_# U.S. PX], PXP (#Y_P) (“The policy of allotment of Indian 
lands quickly proved disastrous for the Indians.”); Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: 
Indian Property Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, $] VAND. L. REV. #$$Y, #$O% 
(WXX#) (“[A]llotment replaced myriad functioning and evolving tribal property systems with 
a single dysfunctional and unchanging system. . . . Most significantly, it destroyed tribes’ 
power to adapt their property laws to meet new social, economic, political, and ecological 
conditions.”); Frickey, supra note #W, at ]$ (“Under the policy of allotment, Congress 
deprived Indians of more than two-thirds of their land base between #__P and #Y%].”). 
27 See, e.g., In re Kansas Indians, PW U.S. ($ Wall.) P%P, P$_ (#_OP) (describing the basis 
of one treaty between the federal government and a tribe as “the separation of estates and 
interests, [that] would so weaken the tribal organization as to effect its voluntary 
abandonment, and, as a natural result, the incorporation of the Indians with the great body 
of the people”); United States v. Clapox, %$ F. $P$, $PP (D. Or. #___) (portraying reservations 
as government run incubators of Indians “for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and 
aspirations which distinguish the civilized from the uncivilized man”). 
 
WX#Y] ICWA and the Unwed Father #$#Y 
In the period following the Civil War, the federal government’s 
assimilationist policies came to dominate,28 marking an abrupt end to a 
treaty-based system through which tribes were primarily viewed by 
Congress as political sovereigns.29 The Supreme Court often abetted these 
efforts through largely permissive, vacillating conceptions of the federal 
government’s power over American Indians and the land they occupied.30 
A central component of that assimilationist movement was the system 
of boarding schools created by Congress to strip American Indian children 
of their cultural identities.31 The teachings of the schools, often anathema 
to tribal customs and mores,32 were meant to facilitate cultural genocide33 
and the removal of Indian children from the purview of their families and 
tribes.34 
 
28 See DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, FIFTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ] (#__Y) 
(advising that “tribal relations should be broken up, socialism destroyed, and the family and the 
autonomy of the individual substituted”); Sharon O’Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does 
the United States Maintain a Relationship?, OO NOTRE DAME L. REV. #]O#, #]O]-O$ (#YY#); see also 
Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, #%W U. PA. 
L. REV. #Y$, WX$-XO (#Y_]) (explaining the diverging rationales for tribal assimilation in the late 
nineteenth century); Theodore Roosevelt’s First Annual Message to the Senate and House of 
Representatives (Dec. %, #YX#), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/WXO#_P 
[https://perma.cc/N_MS-PLQT] (praising a recently enacted federal law as “a mighty pulverizing 
engine to break up the tribal mass” and advocating for “[t]he marriage laws of the Indians [to] be 
made the same as those of the whites”). 
29 Act of Mar. %, #_P#, ch. #WX § #, #O Stat. $]], $OO (“[H]ereafter, no Indian nation or tribe 
within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent 
nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty . . . .”). 
30 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, %X U.S. ($ Pet.) #, #P (#_%#) (noting that Indians 
“occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect 
in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of 
pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”); Sarah 
H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, _# TEX. L. REV. #, W$ (WXXW) (“From 
its earliest decisions, the Supreme Court established that national power over Indians derived 
in part from extraconstitutional, inherent powers relating to colonial discovery and the 
Indians’ aboriginal status.”). But see generally Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and 
Humanity: Reflections on the Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, %# ARIZ. L. REV. 
WX% (#Y_Y) (casting doubt on the judicial presumptions which underlie federal Indian law). 
31 See O’Brien, supra note W_, at #]O$. 
32 See Angelique Eagle Woman & G. William Rice, American Indian Children and U.S. Policy, 
#O TRIBAL L.J. #, ] (WX#O) (“Christian and government boarding schools subjected Indian children to 
treatment at the polar opposite from the concept of respect and caring in Indigenous tribal society.”). 
33 Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New 
Understanding of State Court Resistance, $# EMORY L.J. $_W, OXW (WXXW) (“The well-established 
tradition of white-run boarding schools dates back to the #_XXs when Indian children were the 
targets of blatant cultural genocide.”). 
34 Lorie M. Graham, “The Past Never Vanishes”: A Contextual Critique of the Existing 
Indian Family Doctrine, W% AM. INDIAN L. REV. #, #X (#YY_) (“[S]tarting with the colonial 
missionaries, education became one of the most pernicious methods used to separate American 
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In addition to indoctrination, the schools endeavored to pacify Indian 
children and their parents amidst growing hostilities between tribes and 
the federal government.35 The government achieved these ends through 
compulsion, threatening to withhold rations from Indian families whose 
children did not attend school36—a practice sanctioned by Congress.37 
According to the federal government’s own report, the schools were 
“largely ineffective” at educating Indian children.38 But they did succeed 
in devastating tribes and Indian families through a “psychological assault 
on [Indian] identity” that pervaded “every aspect of boarding school 
life.”39 In addition to pillorying Indian children for their cultural heritage, 
the schools exposed their students to sordid living conditions40 and 
violated numerous treaties through which the federal government had 
guaranteed tribes adequate access to schools on their reservations.41 The 
plight of Indian children subjected to those schools eventually reached 
such a fever pitch that Congress sought to ban their forced enrollment.42  
During that same period, by federal mandate, Indian children were 
relocated to white-owned farms in the East and Midwest where they were 
similarly conditioned to shed their cultural identities.43 The Indian 
Reorganization Act of #Y%] ostensibly sought to curb the forced 
assimilation which had, until that time, defined the federal government’s 
stance toward Indian existence.44 But that was followed by a period in 
which further tribal destruction ensued, and formal ties with many tribes 
were severed as states were granted criminal jurisdiction over tribal lands 
for purposes of further bringing tribal members within the ambit of the 
American system.45 
 
Indian children from the influences of family and community and assimilate them into 
mainstream society.”). 
35 Daniel M. Rosenfelt, Indian Schools and Community Control, W$ STAN. L. REV. ]_Y, ]Y% 
(#YP%). 
36 Berger, supra note W$, at WX#P. 
37 Act of Mar. %, #_Y%, ch. WXY, WP Stat. O#W, O%$. 
38 INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION _ (#YW_). 
39 Andrea A. Curcio, Civil Claims for Uncivilized Acts: Filing Suit Against the Government 
for American Indian Boarding School Abuses, ] HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. ]$, OX (WXXO). 
40 INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, supra note %_, at ##. 
41 Curcio, supra note %Y, at $P. 
42 Act of Mar. W, #_Y$ ch. #__, W_ Stat. YXO (“Hereinafter no Indian child shall be sent from 
any Indian reservation to a school beyond the state or territory in which said reservation is 
situated without the voluntary consent of the father or mother of such child.”). 
43 Atwood, supra note %%, at OXW. 
44 W$ U.S.C. §§ ]O#-PY (WX#W); see also Morton v. Mancari, $#P U.S. $%$, $$% (#YP]) 
(“Congress in #Y%] determined that proper fulfillment of its trust required turning over to Indians 
a greater control of their own destinies. The overly paternalistic approach of prior years had 
proved both exploitative and destructive of Indian interests.”). 
45 O’Brien, supra note W_, at #]OO-OP. 
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With the advent of the midcentury Civil Rights Movement, federal 
policy toward American Indians shifted from one of forced assimilation 
and tribal termination to that of support for Indian self-determination.46 In 
#YP_, ICWA was enacted in the midst of that shift, a period in which the 
federal government set upon a “new orientation” towards American 
Indians.47 
B. ICWA as Revolution: Shifting the Tide in Favor of Tribal Unification 
At the time of ICWA’s enactment, “the American Indian child-welfare 
crisis” had reached “massive proportions.”48 Surveys indicated that 
between twenty-five and thirty-five percent of all American Indian 
children had been separated from their families.49 Eighty-five percent of 
Indian children removed from their homes and placed into foster care 
were relocated to non-Indian homes.50 Those removals were 
overwhelmingly a product of cultural biases and misconceptions about 
American Indian family structures.51 According to testimony Congress 
received prior to ICWA’s enactment, the “nontribal government 
authorities” who extracted Indian children from their families had “no 
basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises 
underlying Indian life and childbearing.”52 
 
46 Graham, supra note %], at WW-W%; see also Richard M. Nixon, President, U.S., Special 
Message on Indian Affairs to the Congress of the U.S. (July _, #YPX) (“We must assure the Indian 
that he can assume control of his own life without being separated involuntary from the tribal 
group. And we must make it clear that Indians can become independent of Federal control 
without being cut off from Federal concern and Federal support.”). 
47 O’Brien, supra note W_, at #]OP. 
48 Gaylene J. McCartney, The American Indian Child-Welfare Crisis: Cultural Genocide 
or First Amendment Preservation, P COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. $WY, $%X (#YP$). 
49 H.R. REP. NO. Y$-#%_O, at Y (#YP_). 
50 David Woodward, The Rights of Reservation Parents and Children: Cultural Survival 
or the Final Termination?, % AM. INDIAN L. REV. W#, WW (#YP$). Prior to the Act’s passage, “many 
Indian families were unable to qualify as foster or adoptive families because they did not meet 
standards ‘based on middle-class values,’ resulting in most Indian children being placed with 
non-Indian families.” Allison Krause Elder, “Indian” as a Political Classification: Reading the 
Tribe Back into the Indian Child Welfare Act, #% NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y ]#P, ]#_ (WX#_) (footnote 
omitted). 
51 Graham, supra note %], at W$. 
52 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs & Pub. Lands of the Comm. on 
Interior & Insular Affairs on S. ScSd, cd Session, Y$th Cong. #YX (#YP_) (statement of Calvin 
Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of the Choctaw Indians and Member of the 
National Tribal Chairmen’s Association). American Indian children remain overrepresented 
in the American foster system today. See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT 
JUDGES, DISPROPORTIONALITY RATES FOR CHILDREN OF COLOR IN FOSTER CARE $ tbl.# 
(WX#$) (showing that American Indian children, along with their African American 
counterparts, are the most disproportionately represented race of children in the foster care 
system); see also Maylinn Smith, Where Have All the Children Gone? When Will They Ever 
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ICWA was Congress’s response to this “growing crisis with respect to 
the breakup of Indian families and the placement of Indian children, at an 
alarming rate, with non-Indian foster or adoptive homes.”53 It was enacted 
to shield American Indian families from unwarranted invasions into 
familial autonomy and to provide tribes the power to make child welfare 
decisions for Indian children subject to removal proceedings. 
Acting pursuant to its “plenary power over Indian affairs,”54 Congress 
deemed it “the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian 
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and 
families” by enacting “minimum Federal standards for the removal of 
Indian children from their homes,” and their subsequent placement “in 
foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique value of Indian 
culture.”55 ICWA’s provisions stem from the premise that “there is no 
resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of 
Indian tribes than their children,”56 and provide procedural and substantive 
protections for Indian children, their parents, and tribes in state court child 
welfare proceedings.57 As such, ICWA represents a delicate balancing act 
from a Congress unwilling to completely wrest control over Indian child 
 
Learn?, in FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT %X, at W]%, W]P 
(Mathew L. M. Fletcher et al. eds., WXXY) (“Although helpful, evidently legislation alone 
cannot eliminate the overrepresentation of Indian children in state social services systems.”). 
53 H.R. REP. NO. Y$-#%_O, at #Y (#YP_). A report issued by the Senate committee considering 
ICWA further explained that 
[t]he separation of Indian children from their natural parents, especially their 
placement in institutions or homes which do not meet their special needs, is socially 
and culturally undesirable. For the child, such separation can cause a loss of identity 
and self-esteem, and contributes directly to the unreasonably high rates among Indian 
children for dropouts, alcoholism and drug abuse, suicides, and crime. For the parents, 
such separation can cause a similar loss of self-esteem, aggravates the conditions 
which initially give rise to the family breakup, and leads to a continued cycle of poverty 
and despair. 
S. REP. NO. Y$-$YP, at #-W (#YP_). 
54 W$ U.S.C. § #YX#(#) (WX#W). The Supreme Court has described that plenary power, derived 
from Article I, Section _ of the Constitution, as being “exercised by Congress from the 
beginning.” Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, #_P U.S. $$%, $O$ (#YX%). 
55 W$ U.S.C. § #YXW (WX#W). This culture-specific approach was in accord with testimony 
received by Congress during its ICWA deliberations. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Indian Affairs & Pub. Lands of the Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs on S. ScSd, cd 
Session, Y$th Cong. OO (#YP_) (statement of Goldie Denny, Director of Social Services, 
Quinault Nation, Representing National Congress of American Indians) (“General child 
welfare legislation, no matter how well meaning, does not address the unique legal, cultural 
status of Indian people. Rather, [it] tend[s] to promulgate the existing problems.”). 
56 W$ U.S.C. § #YX#(%) (WX#W). 
57 ICWA is inapplicable to tribal court proceedings. Id. § #Y##. 
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custody proceedings from state tribunals,58 but eerily cognizant of the 
potential for bias which the continued, unregulated use of those tribunals 
could portend.59 
ICWA defines child custody proceedings to include foster care 
placement, termination of parental rights proceedings, preadoptive 
placements, and adoptions.60 For purposes of the Act, Indians are defined 
as members of Indian tribes and Alaska Natives belonging to Regional 
Corporations.61 An Indian child under the Act is an unmarried person 
below the age of eighteen who is “either (a) a member of an Indian tribe 
or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological 
child of a member of an Indian tribe.”62 ICWA defines “parent” to exclude 
“the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or 
established.”63 
 
58 See H.R. REP. NO. Y$-#%_O, at #Y (#YP_) (“While the committee does not feel that it is 
necessary or desirable to oust the States of their traditional jurisdiction over Indian children 
falling within their geographic limits, it does feel the need to establish minimum Federal 
standards and procedural safeguards in State Indian child custody proceedings . . . .”); Michael 
C. Snyder, An Overview of the Indian Child Welfare Act, P ST. THOMAS L. REV. _#$, _WX (#YY$) 
(“The purpose of the ICWA was to halt unwarranted state court removal of Indian children.”). 
The recognition of the hostility of states toward their Indian inhabitants was by no means novel. 
See United States v. Kagama, ##_ U.S. %P$, %_] (#__O) (“Because of the local ill feeling, the 
people of the States where [Indians] are found are often their deadliest enemies.”). 
59 ICWA is explicit in its condemnation of states’ roles in effectuating the rupture of Indian 
families. At the outset, it describes those removals as “often unwarranted” and charges states 
with “fail[ing] to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and 
social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.” W$ U.S.C. § #YX#(])-($) (WX#W). 
60 Id. § #YX%(#). ICWA does not apply to juvenile delinquency placements or divorce 
proceedings where custody of an Indian child is at issue. Id. But only juvenile delinquency 
placements stemming from acts which, if committed by an adult, would be considered a crime, 
are intended to be exempt from ICWA’s requirements. Id. However, many states appear to 
exempt juvenile delinquency placement proceedings for Indian status offenders in contradiction 
of the Act’s intended scope. See generally Thalia Gonzalez, Reclaiming the Promise of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act: A Study of State Incorporation and Adoption of Legal Protections for 
Indian Status Offenders, ]W N.M. L. REV. #%# (WX#W) (arguing that state courts failing to 
consistently apply IWCA’s provisions regarding juvenile exemptions has resulted in an 
undermining of IWCA itself). 
61 W$ U.S.C. § #YX%(%) (WX#W). “In order for a child to be eligible for membership in any tribe, 
the legal status of the child’s mother and father, as ‘parent’ and as tribal members, has to be 
established.” Hollinger, supra note #X, at ]$_. But even then, ICWA is inapplicable where a child’s 
parent is a tribal member, but their child does not qualify for tribal membership. Snyder, supra note 
$_, at _W#-WW. 
62 W$ U.S.C. § #YX%(]) (WX#W). Accordingly, when American Indian children are tribal 
members or eligible for tribal membership, any state court child custody proceeding concerning 
them is subject to ICWA’s provisions even where the child’s American Indian heritage solely 
stems from their biological father and that father is not considered a “parent” under ICWA 
because he has not acknowledged or established paternity. 
63 Id. § #YX%(Y). 
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ICWA also provides Indian tribes exclusive jurisdiction over child 
custody proceedings concerning Indian children “who reside[] or [are] 
domiciled within” their reservation.64 When an Indian child is not 
domiciled or residing within the reservation of their tribe and is subject to 
a state court foster care placement or a termination of parental rights 
proceeding, ICWA compels state courts to transfer the proceeding to the 
tribe in the absence of good cause65 and parental objections.66 It also allows 
for Indian custodians and tribes to intervene in state court proceedings 
dealing with the foster care placements and terminations of parental rights 
to Indian children.67 For involuntary state court proceedings, ICWA 
requires state courts to “notify the parent or Indian custodian and the 
Indian child’s tribe” in cases “where the court knows or has reason to know 
that an Indian child is involved” in the proceeding.68 Most importantly for 
purposes of this Comment, ICWA provides Indian parents a bevy of 
procedural protections intended to safeguard parent–child relationships 
from state interference. 
Among those protections is the right to court-appointed counsel for 
indigent Indian custodians and parents in a “removal, placement or 
termination proceeding.”69 ICWA also provides for a considerable degree 
 
64 Id. § #Y##(a). In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the Supreme Court 
held “that the law of domicile Congress used in the ICWA cannot be one that permits individual 
reservation-domiciled tribal members to defeat the tribe’s exclusive jurisdiction by the simple 
expedient of giving birth and placing the child for adoption off the reservation.” ]YX U.S. %X, $% 
(#Y_Y). 
65 The good cause exception to the transfer requirement quickly became one of ICWA’s 
most controversial provisions, with commentators alleging that it allowed state courts to impute 
their biases into Indian child welfare proceedings. See, e.g., Catherine Brooks, The Indian Child 
Welfare Act in Nebraska: Fifteen Years, A Foundation for the Future, WP CREIGHTON L. REV. 
OO#, O_P-Y# (#YY]) (describing a Nebraska court’s use of the good cause exception as a judgment 
concerning the adequacy of the tribal court system making the transfer request). 
66 W$ U.S.C. § #Y##(b); see also Laverne F. Hill, Comment, Family Group Conferencing: 
An Alternative Approach to the Placement of Alaska Native Children Under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, WW ALASKA L. REV. _Y, #X] (WXX$) (“Even though tribes have the right to be notified 
of proceedings involving children of the tribe and to remove the proceedings to tribal court, the 
underlying philosophy that governs these proceedings is adversarial and culturally insensitive.”). 
67 W$ U.S.C. § #Y##(c). 
68 Id. § #Y#W(a). Federal regulations require the notice to provide the personal identification 
information of the child’s “direct lineal ancestors.” W$ C.F.R. § W%.###(d)(%) (WX#_). However, 
ICWA does not provide for a tribal right to notice in voluntary proceedings, but “[m]any states 
themselves have enacted laws requiring notice in voluntary proceedings so as to protect the 
tribe’s right of intervention.” Atwood, supra note %%, at O#] n.##X. 
69 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(b). States receiving federal child abuse prevention and treatment 
funding are required to provide representatives for children involved in state court abuse and 
neglect proceedings, but not all states guarantee representation for parents involved in parental 
rights termination proceedings. See Amy E. Halbrook, Custody: Kids, Counsel and the 
Constitution, #W DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y #PY, #Y# (WX#P) (“Counsel or a guardian ad 
litem is appointed on a discretionary basis in these matters, in particular in contested matters 
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of protection in the substantive standard by which foster care and parental 
rights termination proceedings are adjudged under the Act. When a state 
seeks to effectuate foster care placement of an Indian child, it is required 
to make “a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence . . . 
that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is 
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”70 For 
parental rights termination proceedings, the applicable standard is beyond 
a reasonable doubt.71 This standard is a higher burden of proof than that 
typically set forth for parents of children who are not Indian.72 
Before placing an Indian child in foster care or attempting to terminate 
that child’s parental rights, ICWA also requires active efforts to prevent the 
dissolution of Indian families.73 However, the active efforts requirement is 
inapplicable to the attempted termination of parental rights of unwed 
biological fathers of Indian children who have not “acknowledged or 
established” their paternity pursuant to § #YX%(Y).74 When a party has made 
such efforts to no avail, ICWA provides adoption preferences for members 
of the child’s extended family,75 members of the child’s tribe, and other 
 
where the suitability of the adoptive placement is questioned or where the child’s best interests 
are otherwise at issue.”). 
70 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(e). 
71 Id. § #Y#W(f). 
72 See, e.g., Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Firlet (In re Miller), ]$# N.W.Wd $PO (Mich. Ct. App. #YYX) 
(rejecting an equal protection challenge brought by a parent of a non-Indian child who objected to 
her parental rights being terminated under a lesser standard than that applied to parents of Indian 
children under ICWA); see also Santosky v. Kramer, ]$$ U.S. P]$, P$_ (#Y_W) (holding that the 
standard of proof in a termination proceeding must be greater than a preponderance of the evidence 
standard). 
73 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(d). This section “applies only in cases where an Indian family’s 
‘breakup’ would be precipitated by the termination of the parent’s rights.” Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl, $PX U.S. O%P, O$# (WX#%). Additionally, “[b]efore a child can be placed in accordance 
with ICWA’s placement preferences, the state has to identify the child as being subject to the 
law.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-X$-WYX, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: 
EXISTING INFORMATION ON IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES COULD BE USED TO TARGET GUIDANCE 
AND ASSISTANCE TO STATES #O (WXX$). 
74 A.A. v. Dep’t of Family & Youth Servs., Y_W P.Wd W$O, WOW (Alaska #YYY). 
75 ICWA defines extended family through either tribal law and custom or as “the Indian child’s 
grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or 
second cousin, or stepparent,” provided that they are at least eighteen years old. W$ U.S.C. § #YX%(W) 
(WX#W). As such, an unwed father who has not acknowledged or established his paternity may not be 
eligible for placement. But see Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at OOP (Breyer, J., concurring) (questioning 
if ICWA provisions, among them § #Y#$(a), “allow an absentee father to reenter the special statutory 
order of preference with support from the tribe”). Section #Y#O(a) permits “a biological parent” to 
“petition for return of custody.” W$ U.S.C. § #Y#O(a) (WX#W). However, “return of custody” implies the 
need for a preexisting custodial relationship, meaning that a biological father who has not 
acknowledged or established his paternity may also not be eligible for relief under this provision. 
Such a reading would be consistent with the Court’s interpretation of § #Y#W(f) in Adoptive Couple, 
discussed further in Part II. 
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Indian families.76 For foster care and preadoptive placements, ICWA’s 
preferences are similar, with an additional preference for Indian foster 
homes licensed or approved by an Indian child’s tribe.77 ICWA also allows 
for the placement preferences of parents to factor into placement 
determinations.78 But ICWA does not permit unwed fathers who have not 
acknowledged or established their paternity to challenge their child’s 
placement for violating ICWA’s provisions.79 Accordingly, an unwed 
father’s ability to assert rights under ICWA is tethered to his ability to 
demonstrate that he has acknowledged or established paternity of his 
biological child. 
II. SECTION #YX%(Y) AND ADOPTIVE COUPLE 
This Part considers the definition of “parent” as defined by state courts 
interpreting § #YX%(Y). It then considers the Supreme Court’s approach, or 
lack thereof, to the same statutory quandary, analyzing the interpretational 
tools utilized by the Court with a particular focus on their utility for 
interpreting § #YX%(Y) moving forward. 
A. State Court Interpretation 
Though a federal law, ICWA is primarily a creature of state court 
jurisprudence.80 State courts sculpt the metes and bounds of ICWA 
largely free of federal court input. In ICWA’s four-decade existence, 
the Supreme Court has decided only two cases concerning the Act 
despite myriad differences in state courts’ interpretations. Among the 
most glaring and consequential are the different frameworks state 
 
76 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#$(a) (WX#W). “These preferences for nonmember Indians can be understood 
. . . as some acknowledgment that tribal government boundaries in the United States today do not 
necessarily reflect cultural dividing lines.” Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, ]Y UCLA L. REV. 
#%P%, #%_# (WXXW). But § #Y#$(a)’s preferences “do[] not bar a non-Indian family . . . from adopting an 
Indian child when no other eligible candidates have sought to adopt the child.” Adoptive Couple, $PX 
U.S. at O]W. 
77 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#$(a). 
78 Id. § #Y#$(c). 
79 See id. § #Y#] (providing that “any parent or Indian custodian from whose custody such 
[an Indian] child was removed, and the Indian child’s tribe may petition any court of competent 
jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of 
sections #Y##, #Y#W, and #Y#% of this title” (emphasis added)). 
80 See Kathryn Fort & Adrian T. Smith, Indian Child Welfare Act Annual Case Law 
Update and Commentary, AM. INDIAN L.J., May ##, WX#_, at %W, ]# (“Prior to WX#$, virtually 
no ICWA cases were filed in federal court.”). 
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courts have developed for determining whether an unwed father has 
attained “parent” status under § #YX%(Y).81 
The varied approaches to interpreting § #YX%(Y) in the cases of unwed 
fathers is reflective of the varied circumstances in which unwed fathers 
invoking ICWA’s protections in child custody proceedings appear before 
state courts.82 Many of those courts have taken plain language approaches 
to interpreting “acknowledged or established,” permitting unwed fathers 
to satisfy § #YX%(Y)’s requirements by taking paternity tests,83 claiming 
paternity during child custody proceedings,84 and through acts construed 
to connote the assumption of paternal responsibilities.85 But other courts 
have taken the opposite approach, rejecting the use of paternity tests to 
establish paternity86 and concluding that a putative father’s 
acknowledgement of paternity to family members is insufficient to 
constitute acknowledgment under the Act.87 Courts have also varied in 
defining the temporal dimension of their § #YX%(Y) analyses. Fathers have 
been held to qualify as parents under the Act following years of absence 
 
81 See Christopher Deluzio, Tribes and Race: The Court’s Missed Opportunity in Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl, ]$ PACE L. REV. $XY, $W# (WX#]) (“There has been silence in the academic 
discourse surrounding this disagreement among the states about how to define paternity under 
the ICWA. Regardless, this split affects a large portion of the nation’s Indian population and has 
muddied the waters for putative Indian fathers affected by . . . termination or adoption 
proceedings.”). 
82 Despite their diverging approaches to determining whether a putative father has 
“acknowledged or established” his paternity, state courts appear unanimous in noting that paternity 
cannot be established in accord with ICWA when a biological father is unknown or has made no 
claim of paternity. See, e.g., Hampton v. J.A.L., O$_ So.Wd %%#, %%O, %%% (La. #YY$) (noting that an 
Indian child’s paternity “ha[d] not been conclusively established” in a case where “[t]he alleged 
father has had no contact with the child”); In re N.R., No. WX#O-PP, WX#O WL $%]]X%Y, at *#] (Vt. 
WX#O) (noting that paternity “had not been established” in a case where the biological father’s 
identity was unknown). 
83 See, e.g., In re J.S., %W# P.%d #X%, #XY (Mont. WX#]); Noah v. Kelly B., OP P.%d %$Y, 
%OP (Okla. Civ. App. WXX%). 
84 See, e.g., In re I.M. & M., No. WY$XYW, WX#X WL WX#O%WO, at *O n.% (Mich. Ct. App. 
May WX, WX#X) (“At the time of the preliminary hearing, I.M.’s father had not yet established 
parentage, but did so later in the proceedings.”). 
85 See, e.g., Leatherman v. Yancey, #X% P.%d #XYY, ##X_ n.W] (Okla. WXX]) (“[E]vidence 
reflects that the father met the minimal statutory requirements by grasping his parental rights 
and exercising his parental duties to the extent of his ability.”). 
86 See In re Michael J., No. A#X%#Y_, WXX] WL $$#W$#, at *#O (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. WW, WXX]) 
(“The language of the ICWA suggests that something more than a blood test result is necessary 
for an unwed father to ‘acknowledge or establish’ his paternity.”). 
87 See In re Adoption of Child of Indian Heritage, $]% A.Wd YW$, Y%%-%] (N.J. #Y__) (“Although 
petitioners contend that [the putative father’s] alleged claims of paternity to members of his family 
prior to the birth of the child constitute an acknowledgment of paternity under the ICWA, we 
disagree.”). 
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in their children’s lives.88 Conversely, they have also been barred from 
asserting rights under ICWA as a “parent” due to years of paternal 
absence.89 Other courts have avoided defining “acknowledged or 
established” entirely.90 
When state courts have strayed from interpretations of the “plain 
terms”91 of § #YX%(Y), they have largely chosen to either impart their 
state’s paternity establishment procedures into the Act or fashion a new 
standard solely applicable to ICWA. Five states—California, New Jersey, 
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Arizona—incorporate state law.92 These courts 
 
88 See, e.g., In re Morgan, %O] N.W.Wd P$], P$$, P$_ (Mich. Ct. App. #Y_$) (holding that a 
putative father, unwed to the child’s mother at the time of the child’s birth and for more than two 
years afterwards, had “reestablished” his relationship with his child by regularly visiting him at his 
foster home); In re J.S., %W# P.%d at #XY, ### (holding that a putative father, who first visited his son 
during a state-facilitated meeting when he was eight years old, had established paternity of his child 
under § #YX%(Y)). 
89 See, e.g., In re S.A.M., PX% S.W.Wd OX%, OXP (Mo. Ct. App. #Y_O) (assuming that a father 
who claimed paternity through acknowledgment expressed in a court motion was a “parent” 
under ICWA, but holding that § #Y#W(f) was inapplicable because the putative father “never had 
custody” of his child). Notably, this same interpretive approach was utilized by the Supreme 
Court in Adoptive Couple, as will be discussed in Section II.B. 
90 See, e.g., Div. of Family Servs. v. S. R., No. XW-%]]]], WXX] Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS ##$, 
at *]# (noting that “acknowledge[ment]” of paternity is “a requirement for the establishment 
of a parent-child relationship for purposes of qualification under the Indian Child Welfare Act,” 
but not describing what acknowledgment entails). 
91 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, P%# S.E.Wd $$X, $OX (S.C. WX#W), rev’d, $PX U.S. O%P 
(WX#%). 
92 See Jared P. v. Glade T., WXY P.%d #$P, #O# (Ariz. Ct. App. WXXY) (“[W]e look to state law 
to determine whether paternity has been acknowledged or established.”); In re Daniel M., # 
Cal. Rptr. %d _YP, _YY (Cal. Ct. App. WXX%) (explaining that California’s paternity establishment 
law “is substantively indistinguishable from” § #YX%(Y)); Child of Indian Heritage, $]% A.Wd at 
Y%$ (“Congress intended to defer to state or tribal law standards for establishing paternity 
. . . .”); In re Baby Boy D., P]W P.Wd #X$Y, #XO] (Okla. #Y_$) (interpreting § #YX%(Y) “to mean 
acknowledged or established through the procedures available through the tribal courts, 
consistent with tribal customs, or through procedures established by state law”), cert denied, 
]_] U.S. #XPW (#Y__), overruled on other grounds by Leatherman v. Yancey, #X% P.%d #XYY, ##X# 
(Okla. WXX]); In re Morgan, No. XWAX#-YOX_-CH-XXWXO, #YYP WL P#O__X, at *#P (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Nov. #Y, #YYP) (adopting the interpretation of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in In re 
Baby Boy D.); Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, YXO S.W.Wd #$W, #P% (Tex. Ct. App. #YY$) 
(“Congress intended to have the issue of acknowledgment or establishment of paternity 
determined by state law.”). At least one commentator has described South Carolina as one of 
the states that “do not look to their state laws when determining whether paternity has been 
‘acknowledged’ or ‘established’ under the ICWA.” Deluzio, supra note _#, at $W#. This 
contention is premised on the South Carolina Supreme Court’s purported rejection of an 
interpretation of § #YX%(Y) dictated by state law. Id. at $]#. However, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court has not definitively resolved this question. In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 
the court noted that a party’s state law incorporation contention conflated paternity and paternal 
consent to adoption. P%# S.E.Wd at $OX. It did not, however, conclusively reject the conflation. 
Rather, it resolved the paternity issue in question by stating that the unwed putative father had 
satisfied the “plain terms” of § #YX%(Y) “by both acknowledging his paternity through the 
pursuit of court proceedings . . . and establishing his paternity through DNA testing.” Id. 
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have held that Congress effectively ceded the terrain of paternity 
definition in ICWA to the states by not defining “acknowledged or 
established.” Of those five, three—New Jersey, Oklahoma, and 
Tennessee—also permit the incorporation of tribal law.93 Alaska and Utah 
both utilize flexible standards disconnected from state law to determine 
whether an unwed father is a parent under ICWA.94 The “acknowledged 
or established” definitions they have fashioned are amorphous standards 
of “reasonableness” intended to extend judicial flexibility to courts faced 
with sympathetic fathers seeking to invoke ICWA’s machinery.95 
Fittingly, a lack of sympathy appeared to animate the Supreme Court’s 
decision when faced with the same issue. 
B. Section STUV(T) Following Adoptive Couple 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the Supreme Court’s sole foray into 
interpreting § #YX%(Y), provides the best support for why a federal 
standard is needed to govern the meaning of “acknowledged or 
established.” But despite granting certiorari to determine whether 
“parent” includes an unwed father who has not complied with state 
paternity law, the Court avoided answering that question.96 Their method 
of doing so—seemingly adopting a framework of paternity principles 
established in a string of earlier family law cases—reveals the lens 
through which fatherhood, in the context of ICWA, should be refracted. 
In Adoptive Couple, an unwed American Indian father (“Biological 
Father”) sought custody of his child (“Baby Girl”) with a non-Indian 
woman (“Birth Mother”) after previously renouncing claims to custody, 
and after she arranged for the child to be adopted. Biological Father, an 
 
93 Child of Indian Heritage, $]% A.Wd at Y%$; Baby Boy D., P]W P.Wd at #XO]; Morgan, 
#YYP WL P#O__X, at *#P. 
94 Bruce L. v. W.E., W]P P.%d YOO, YPY (Alaska WX##) (“[T]o qualify as an ICWA parent an 
unwed father does not need to comply perfectly with state laws for establishing paternity, so 
long as he has made reasonable efforts to acknowledge paternity.”); E.T. v. R.K.B. (In re B.B.), 
]#P P.%d #, W# (Utah WX#P) (“We reject the notion that courts should rely on state law to determine 
whether an unmarried biological father has acknowledged or established paternity under 
ICWA.”). 
95 The durability of these standards in comparison to the more rigid and routine 
application of state law is unclear. Even where courts are ostensibly receptive to actions of 
paternity acknowledgment and establishment not recognized by state law, state law remains 
the fulcrum through which acknowledgment and establishment are conceptualized. This is 
most evident in Arizona, where state courts have held that the filing of state paternity actions 
or pursuit of legal custody “are not required,” Michael J. v. Michael J., Sr., P P.%d YOX, YO% 
(Ariz. Ct. App. WXXX), despite the general application of “state law to determine whether 
paternity has been acknowledged or established.” Jared P., WXY P.%d at #O#. 
96 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, $PX U.S. O%P, O]O (WX#%) (“We need not—and 
therefore do not—decide whether Biological Father is a ‘parent.’”). 
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enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation, was on active duty with the 
United States Army and stationed in Oklahoma, roughly four hours away 
from Birth Mother, when she informed him one month into their 
engagement that she was pregnant.97 Following the announcement, their 
relationship became strained due to Biological Father’s insistence that they 
get married prior to Baby Girl’s birth.98 Approximately four months after 
announcing her pregnancy, Birth Mother ended their engagement, after 
which Biological Father made no attempts to contact her.99 Three 
months before their child was born, Birth Mother asked Biological 
Father whether “he would rather pay child support or surrender his 
parental rights.”100 He chose the latter, but he later testified that he 
understood his response to indicate that he was surrendering his rights 
to Biological Mother, allowing her time to think and for the potential 
rekindling of their relationship.101 
Birth Mother then proceeded to contact a private adoption agency and 
selected a non-Indian married couple (“Adoptive Couple”) to adopt Baby 
Girl.102 The couple “provided financial assistance to Mother during the 
final months of her pregnancy and after Baby Girl’s birth.”103 During that 
same period, Biological Father provided no support.104 However, 
Biological Father was unaware that Birth Mother arranged for Baby Girl’s 
adoption, and he “insist[ed] that, had he known this, he would have never 
considered relinquishing his rights.”105 Biological Father was similarly 
unaware of Baby Girl’s birth.106 When Birth Mother went into labor, she 
requested that the hospital not report her admittance.107 She “signed forms 
relinquishing her parental rights and consenting to the adoption” the 
following day.108 But in doing so, she identified Baby Girl as only Hispanic 
 
97 Id. at O]%. 
98 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, P%# S.E.Wd $$X, $$% (S.C. WX#W). Birth Father testified 
that he wanted to marry Birth Mother prior to their daughter’s birth so that Baby Girl would 
not be born out of wedlock. Id. at $$% n.%. 





104 See id. (“It is undisputed that Mother and Father did not live together prior to the baby’s 
birth and that Father did not support Mother financially for pregnancy related expenses, even 
though he had the ability to provide some degree of financial assistance to Mother.”). 
105 Id. 
106 He was, however, “aware of Mother’s expected due date.” Id. at $$$. 
107 Id. at $$]. According to Birth Mother, this was to prevent contact with the father and 
had been her practice in previous births. Id. at $$] n.P. 
108 Id. at $$]. 
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despite being aware of Father’s Cherokee heritage.109 By omitting Baby 
Girl’s Indian heritage, Birth Mother prevented the Cherokee Nation from 
objecting under Oklahoma law to Baby Girl’s removal from the state by 
Adoptive Couple.110  
The omission of Baby Girl’s Indian ancestry and its ramifications fit a 
pattern in the months preceding and following Baby Girl’s birth. Birth 
Mother was initially reluctant to reveal Biological Father’s tribal 
membership to the adoption agency.111 Adoptive Couple were even 
unaware of Baby Girl’s eligibility for tribal enrollment when Birth Mother 
relinquished her parental rights.112 Upon being informed of Biological 
Father’s Indian status, the lawyer retained by Adoptive Couple on 
Biological Mother’s behalf sent a letter to the Cherokee Nation to confirm 
Biological Father’s tribal enrollment.113 However, the letter misspelled 
Biological Father’s name and misstated his birthdate, leaving the 
Cherokee Nation unable to verify his enrollment.114 
Biological Father only became aware of Baby Girl’s removal to South 
Carolina and her pending adoption four months after her birth when he 
was presented with adoption papers by a process server hired by Adoptive 
Couple days before his scheduled deployment to Iraq.115 The “Acceptance 
of Service Form” signed by Biological Father stated that he was not 
contesting Baby Girl’s adoption.116 Biological Father thought that he was 
signing over parental rights to Biological Mother and “did not realize that 
he consented to Baby Girl’s adoption by another family until after he 
signed the papers. Upon realizing that [Biological] Mother had 
relinquished her [parental] rights to [Adoptive Couple],” Biological Father 
attempted to grab the papers from the process server who warned him that 
 
109 Id. Birth Mother is “predominantly Hispanic,” Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, $PX U.S. 
O%P, O]% (WX#%), and “testified that she believed she also had Cherokee heritage, but she was not 
a registered member of the Cherokee Nation.” Adoptive Couple, P%# S.E.Wd at $$] n.$. The 
Nation, like many other tribes, makes its citizenship determinations “based on descent from 
historic membership rolls.” Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, 
and the Constitutional Minimum, OY STAN. L. REV. ]Y#, $##-#W (WX#P). Despite Birth Mother’s 
nonmember Cherokee status, ICWA was still applicable due to Baby Girl’s eligibility for 
membership in the Cherokee Nation. Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O]W n.#; see also supra note 
OW and accompanying text. 
110 Adoptive Couple, P%# S.E.Wd at $$$ n._. The Cherokee Nation did not become aware of 
Baby Girl’s Indian status under ICWA until four months after her birth. Id. at $$$. 
111 Id. at $$]. 
112 Id. at $$$. 
113 Id. at $$]. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at $$$. 
116 Id. 
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he would go to jail if he damaged the documents.117 Biological Father then 
consulted a lawyer and intervened in the South Carolina adoption 
proceeding the next day.118 A court-ordered paternity test later 
conclusively established that Baby Girl was Biological Father’s 
offspring.119 The family court then determined that ICWA applied to the 
adoption proceedings and, following a trial, denied Adoptive Couple’s 
adoption petition upon a finding that ICWA’s requirements had not been 
satisfied.120 Custody of Baby Girl was then transferred to Biological Father 
approximately twenty-seven months after her birth. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. Despite acknowledging 
that “ICWA does not explicitly set forth a procedure for an unwed father 
to acknowledge or establish paternity,” it concluded that Biological 
Father was a “parent” under the Act because he established his paternity 
through DNA testing and acknowledged it by pursuing custody of his 
daughter after becoming aware of the pending adoption proceedings.121 
It further held that the consent of Biological Father in signing the 
“Acceptance of Service” form violated § #Y#%(a)’s requirement that 
voluntary terminations of parental rights be recorded before and certified 
by a judge.122 Under its analysis, the proposed adoption also violated 
ICWA’s procedures for involuntary termination of parental rights. The 
state supreme court found that Adoptive Couple had failed to satisfy 
§ #Y#W(d)’s requirement of the exhaustion of active efforts to prevent the 
dissolution of an Indian family.123 Moreover, the court found transfer of 
custody to the father in accord with the Act’s core purpose of 
“preserv[ing] American Indian culture by retaining its children within 
the tribe.”124 
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held, assuming for purposes 
of the argument that Biological Father was a “parent” under § #YX%(Y),125 
that §§ #Y#W(d) and (f) did not “bar[] the termination of his parental 
rights” because he never had custody over his child.126 The Court 
reasoned that § #Y#W(f)’s reference to “the continued custody of the child 





120 Id. at $$O. 
121 Id. at $OX. 
122 Id. at $O#. 
123 Id. at $OW. 
124 Id. at $OO. 
125 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, $PX U.S. O%P, O]O-]P (WX#%). 
126 Id. at O]P. 
127 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(f) (WX#W). 
 
WX#Y] ICWA and the Unwed Father #$%% 
had at some point in the past).”128 Because Biological Father never had 
custody prior to the adoption proceedings, § #Y#W(f)’s requirement of a 
“determination” of “likely . . . serious emotional or physical damage to 
the child”129 was irrelevant. The Court similarly reasoned that “when an 
Indian parent abandons an Indian child prior to birth and that child has 
never been in the Indian parent’s legal or physical custody . . . the 
‘breakup of the Indian family’ has long since occurred and § #Y#W(d) is 
inapplicable.”130 
The Adoptive Couple Court’s statutory analysis was consistent with its 
understanding of the Act’s core purpose. In the Court’s view, the “removal 
of Indian children from Indian families’ was “the primary mischief” 
ICWA was intended to curb.131 But because no Indian family existed here, 
the goal of the Act was not implicated and Biological Father’s status as a 
“parent” could not afford him the right to the substantive protections 
provided in §§ #Y#W(d) and (f).132 The Court further explained that it was 
hesitant to apply § #Y#W(d)’s requirement of “remedial services and 
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian 
family”133 in this case out of a concern that “it would surely dissuade some 
[prospective adoptive parents] from seeking to adopt Indian children.”134 
 
128 Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O]_. 
129 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(f) (WX#W). 
130 Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O$#-$W. The Court’s reasoning here likely applies no matter 
the status of a parent as “Indian” under the Act. See W$ U.S.C. § #YX%(%) (WX#W) (defining “Indian” 
as “any person who is a member of an Indian tribe or who is an Alaska Native and a member of 
a Regional Corporation”). Despite the Court’s use of the term “Indian parent” in its discussion 
of § #Y#W(d), a parent need not be Indian to have protected rights under the Act. Rather, for ICWA 
to apply in a child custody proceeding, the proceeding need only involve an Indian child as 
defined by § #YX%(]). S.S. v. Stephanie H., %__ P.%d $OY, $P] (Ariz. Ct. App. WX#P); Michelle L. 
Lehmann, Note, The Indian Child Welfare Act of STfg: Does it Apply to the Adoption of an 
Illegitimate Child?, %_ CATH. U. L. REV. $##, $]X (#Y_Y). 
131 Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O]Y. 
132 Id.; see also id. at O$# n.P (“Congress did not extend the heightened protections of 
§§ #Y#W(d) and (f) to all biological fathers.”). 
133 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(d) (WX#W). 
134 Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O$%. The Court cast § #Y#W(d)’s requirement as a “sensible” 
one for state-employed social workers and implicitly endorsed its fulfillment by tribes. Id. at O$%, 
O$% n.Y. However, the text of § #Y#W(d) does not make any distinctions with regards to the entities 
or individuals subject to its requirements. Rather, it imparts the duty of proving that unsuccessful 
“active efforts . . . to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent 
the breakup of the Indian family” have taken place on “[a]ny party seeking to effect a foster care 
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child.” W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(d) (WX#W) 
(emphasis added). 
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The ruling effectively made it so that “race (as manifested by biology) 
is insufficient to grant a parent access to ICWA’s protections.”135 As such, 
it marked “a shift in ICWA jurisprudence from a notion of parenthood as 
rooted in biology to one requiring physical or legal custody, or, 
alternatively, a social relationship beyond mere genetic relatedness.”136 
This reasoning is consonant with the Court’s holdings in a string of cases 
challenging state laws cabining the rights of unwed fathers.137 In those 
cases, the Court has articulated a standard requiring unwed fathers to 
demonstrate more than just biological ties to their children in order to 
claim parental rights.138 Reading the Adoptive Couple decision as an 
extension of this doctrine provides the proper vehicle through which to 
situate a standard definition of “acknowledged or established” under 
§ #YX%(Y). 
III. BIOLOGY PLUS AND THE UNWED FATHER 
Questions of parental identity are not explicitly solved by the text of the 
Constitution. At common law, biological fathers had no right to assert 
 
135 Shreya A. Fadia, Note, Adopting “Biology Plus” in Federal Indian Law: Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl’s Refashioning of ICWA’s Framework, ##] COLUM. L. REV. WXXP, WX]% 
(WX#]). 
136 Id. at WXW]. Indeed, a fear that “the Act would put certain vulnerable children at a great 
disadvantage solely because an ancestor—even a remote one—was an Indian,” permeates the 
Court’s opinion. Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O$$. The Court’s multiple references to Baby Girl’s 
“%/W$O Cherokee” heritage, id. at O]O, and its conclusion that “equal protection concerns,” id. at 
O$O, militated against a contrary ruling have been understood “as inviting a broader constitutional 
challenge to the Act under a theory of racial discrimination.” Elder, supra note $X, at ]%%. But see 
Fadia, supra note #%$, at WX#_ n._] (“The Court’s recognition of Baby Girl’s eligibility for 
membership and ICWA’s applicability to the case indicates that its discomfort did not determine 
its decision.”). Regardless, the permissibility of ICWA’s framework under the equal protection 
principles embedded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment necessarily implicates 
the continued validity of the Court’s declaration in Morton v. Mancari that “legislative judgments” 
providing “special treatment” for Indians that can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ 
unique obligations towards the Indians . . . will not be disturbed.” ]#P U.S. $%$, $$$ (#YP]). This 
issue—which continues to be litigated and to attract the attention of commentators—is beyond 
the scope of this Comment. 
137 See The Supreme Court, cUSc Term – Leading Cases, #WP HARV. L. REV. #Y_, %P% (WX#%) 
(“Read as a dispute over biology versus care, the case then fits squarely in the parental rights 
jurisprudence preceding it, continuing the Court’s trend toward provisional prioritization of 
family over biology.”). 
138 See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_, W$Y-OX (#Y_%) (noting a “clear distinction 
between a mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental responsibility”). 
This concept of paternity rights has curried favor with commentators who similarly believe that 
a biological connection alone is insufficient to fortify a claim of paternal rights. See, e.g., Nancy 
E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, #] WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. YXY, Y#P (WXXO) (“Fatherhood should be defined as the conduct of nurturing children.”). 
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claims of legal paternity over their biological children.139 Paternity, as a 
legal concept, was granted to men through marriage to their wives and an 
irrefutable presumption that their wives’ children were biologically—and 
legally—their own.140 Under the traditional marital presumption, an unwed 
male who fathers a child with a married woman was barred from legally 
claiming paternity of his biological child.141 But with the advent of new 
constitutional protections of privacy and autonomy, the right to parenthood 
for unwed fathers gained constitutional protection.142 Stanley v. Illinois 
marked the Supreme Court’s first grant of constitutional protection to the 
parental rights of unwed fathers, a striking shift from the common law 
tradition.143 
In Stanley, the Court considered whether “a presumption that 
distinguishes and burdens all unwed fathers [is] constitutionally 
repugnant.”144 Peter Stanley, Sr. lived with Joan Stanley, the mother of his 
children, on and off for eighteen years.145 Upon her death, two of their 
children were placed with a court-appointed married couple.146 Unmarried 
men were excluded from the definition of “parent” under the Illinois statute 
with which Stanley’s children were determined to be of “dependent” status 
following their mother’s death.147 Accordingly, no determination of 
Stanley’s fitness as a parent was made prior to the placement of his children 
 
139 Michael H. v. Gerald D., ]Y# U.S. ##X, #W] (#Y_Y) (plurality opinion); Traci Dallas, Note, 
Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, __ COLUM. L. REV. %OY, 
%PX (#Y__). 
140 See Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the 
Marital Presumption, O$ MD. L. REV. W]O, W]_-]Y (WXXO) (explaining the rationales for the 
marital presumption of paternity—which Congress implicitly transmuted to ICWA through 
its definition of “parent”—as “provid[ing] legal certainty for purposes such as inheritance 
and succession,” “preserv[ing] the integrity of marriage, at least where both parties to the 
marriage so desired,” and “promot[ing] the welfare of the children”). 
141 See Joan C. Sylvain, Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The Presumption of Paternity, %Y 
CATH. U. L. REV. _%#, _%P-%_ (#YYX) (explaining the marital presumption in the context of a California 
statute). 
142 See David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, 
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, $] AM. J. COMP. L. #W$, #W_ (WXXO) (“Before 
the #YPXs, unmarried fathers had only the most tenuous legal rights concerning their children.”). 
143 ]X$ U.S. O]$ (#YPW). 
144 Id. at O]Y. Four years prior to deciding Stanley, the Court invalidated a state law that 
barred children born out of wedlock from filing wrongful death actions stemming from their 
parents’ deaths. Levy v. Louisiana, %Y# U.S. O_, PW (#YO_). Reflecting on that case in Stanley, 
the Court noted that “familial bonds” among family members whose matriarch and patriarch 
are not married “were often as warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a more 
formally organized family unit.” ]X$ U.S. at O$#-$W. 
145 Stanley, ]X$ U.S. at O]O. 
146 In re Stanley, ]$ Ill.Wd #%W, #%% (#YPX). 
147 Id. at #%%-%]. 
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with the married couple.148 However, “married fathers—whether divorced, 
widowed, or separated—and mothers—even if unwed” were presumed fit 
to raise their children.149 
The Court invalidated the statute, holding that “[t]he private interest . . . of 
a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference 
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.”150 The Court stated 
that “as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on 
his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him.”151 In addition, 
the Court held that Illinois had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by rejecting Stanley’s attempt to gain a hearing while 
also affording the opportunity to other parents at risk of losing custody of their 
children.152 
In Stanley, the Court effectively elevated the rights of unmarried 
fathers who “sired and raised” their children to that of their parental 
counterparts.153 The progeny of Stanley reified the importance of due 
process in parental rights termination proceedings.154 But the Court also 
proceeded to pare back any notion that it would take an expansive 
approach to the principles elucidated in Stanley. That process began six 
years later, when the Court unanimously denied an unwed father’s attempt 
to block his child’s adoption by the husband of the woman with whom he 
conceived the child.155 
Leon Webster Quilloin had never married or lived with the mother of 
his son, but he occasionally visited and gave his child gifts.156 Still, he 
 
148 Stanley, ]X$ U.S. at O]O. 
149 Id. at O]P. 
150 Id. at O$#. 
151 Id. at O]Y. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at O$X; Meyer, supra note #]W, at #W_ (interpreting Stanley as holding “that at least 
some unmarried fathers have constitutionally protected interests in relationships with their 
children”). 
154 See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_, WO# (#Y_%) (“When an unwed father 
demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by [coming] forward to 
participate in the rearing of his child . . . his interest in personal contact with his child acquires 
substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn’t Want to be Daddy Anymore: An 
Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, #O YALE J. L. & FEMINISM #Y%, WXP (WXX]) (noting 
that the Court’s “biology plus” test “recognize[s] that biological fathers who have actively 
asserted their parental rights must receive notice of the child’s mother’s intent to have the child 
adopted”). While the question of whether American Indians were entitled to due process was 
settled by this time following Congress’s grant of citizenship to Indians, see supra note #W, that 
question had “remained unanswered through most of the nineteenth century.” Cleveland, supra 
note %X, at WP. 
155 Quilloin v. Walcott, ]%] U.S. W]O, W$O (#YP_). 
156 Id. at W$#. 
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had “never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and, according 
to the Court’s characterization, “never shouldered any significant 
responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, 
or care of the child.”157 Nearly three years after his son’s birth, his mother 
married Randall Walcott.158 Eight years later, Walcott filed a petition for 
adoption.159 Quilloin sought to block the adoption of his son and secure 
visitation rights. He did not, however, attempt to gain custody. The 
Georgia law at issue only required the consent of biological mothers for 
the adoption of children born to unwed parents, but it required the consent 
of both parents in all other situations.160 To thwart the adoption, Quilloin 
sought to legitimize his child, but his petition was denied.161 Invoking 
Stanley, he challenged the law on due process and equal protection 
grounds, claiming that he deserved the same right to withhold his consent 
to adoption as other fathers. 
The Court rejected his claims and held “that the State could permissibly 
give [Quilloin] less veto authority than it provides to a married father.”162 
But it couched that conclusion in the belief that a married father—even one 
whose marriage has dissolved—“will have borne full responsibility for the 
rearing of his children during the period of the marriage.”163 Quilloin, on the 
other hand, never “had, or sought, actual or legal custody of his child.”164 
Accordingly, he had not been denied due process or equal protection under 
the Constitution. 
The Court cast the case as one in which it was merely affirming the 
existence of an intact family—composed of the child, his natural mother, and 
his stepfather—not rejecting the formation of a new family, composed of 
Quilloin and his son.165 In deciding Quilloin, the Court reserved the question 
of whether Georgia’s statute impermissibly distinguished among unmarried 
 
157 Id. at W$O. 
158 Id. at W]P. 
159 Id. at W]Y. 
160 Id. at W]_. 
161 Id. at W$%. There was evidence that Quilloin was unaware of the process for legally 
legitimizing his child until after Walcott filed the adoption petition. Id. at W$]. 
162 Id. at W$O. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at W$$. 
165 See id. (“[T]he result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit 
already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except [Quilloin].”). At least one commentator 
has interpreted the Court’s opinion to stand for the proposition that “an unwed father may have less 
protection when the biological mother is part of the family unit adopting the child.” Susan Swingle, 
Comment, Rights of Unwed Fathers and the Best Interests of the Child: Can These Competing 
Interests Be Harmonized? Illinois’ Putative Father Registry Provides an Answer, WO LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. PX%, P#]-#$ (#YY$). 
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parents by their gender.166 The Court effectively resolved that question in 
Caban v. Mohammed. In Caban, the Court struck down a New York statute 
that allowed an unmarried mother, but not an unmarried father, to contest 
adoption of their child.167 
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived with each other for five 
years, during which they had two children and told others that they were 
married.168 Mohammed eventually left Caban, took their two children with 
her, and married another man.169 However, Caban continued to see his 
children regularly during weekly visits at their grandmother’s apartment 
on the floor above where he lived.170 Their grandmother eventually 
returned to her native Puerto Rico, taking her two grandchildren with 
her.171 During a visit to Puerto Rico, Caban picked up the children and 
returned with them to New York.172 Mohammed then filed a custody 
petition in New York Family Court, which granted Mohammed and her 
husband temporary custody and allowed Caban and his new wife to have 
visitation rights.173 The Mohammeds then filed for adoption of the 
children. The Cabans responded with their own adoption filing.174 The 
Court allowed the Mohammeds to adopt the children, divesting Caban of 
his parental rights in the process.175 Caban was unable to adopt because 
Maria, the biological mother, withheld her consent.176 
In invalidating the statute, the Court noted that Caban’s “parental 
relationship is substantial.”177 It reasoned that New York’s law violated the 
Constitution because it “discriminate[d] against unwed fathers even when 
their identity is known and they have manifested a significant paternal 
interest in the child.”178 In particular, the law impermissibly presumed that 
unwed fathers lacked the parental capacity of mothers.179 
 
166 Caban v. Mohammed, ]]# U.S. %_X, %_Y n.P (#YPY). 
167 Id. at %_W. 




172 Id. at %_%. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at %_%-_]. 
176 Id. at %_]. 
177 Id. at %_P. 
178 Id. at %Y]. This caveat left the Court’s ruling in Quilloin undisturbed. See supra 
text accompanying note #O%. 
179 See id. (“The facts of this case illustrate the harshness of classifying unwed fathers 
as being invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a concerned 
judgment as to the fate of their children.”). 
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But four years later, the Court rejected an unwed father’s attempt to 
intervene in his daughter’s adoption and began again to chip away at a liberal 
reading of its earlier unwed father cases.180 That father, Jonathan Lehr, had 
“never supported and rarely seen” his biological daughter, Jessica.181 
Jessica’s mother, Lorraine Robertson, married another man shortly after 
Jessica’s birth.182 The Robertsons filed for adoption when Jessica was two 
years old.183 The adoption was granted, but Lehr claimed it was invalid 
because he was never given notice of the adoption proceedings.184 He only 
learned of the pending adoption petition after filing for a determination of 
paternity and visitation rights.185 The adoption was granted before his 
paternity determination and visitation requests, which would ultimately be 
denied, were decided,186 and Lehr challenged the adoption on due process 
grounds.187 
The New York law at issue, its putative father registry law, only 
allowed for notice of an adoption proceeding to unwed fathers when 
they registered their claim of paternity with the state.188 As the Court 
framed it, fathers in Lehr’s position had “the opportunity to receive 
notice simply by mailing a postcard to the putative father registry.”189 
But Lehr claimed that “he had a constitutional right to prior notice and 
an opportunity to be heard” before his daughter’s adoption, and that the 
statute’s gender classification ran afoul of the Equal Protection 
Clause.190 
The Court rejected Lehr’s arguments and held that the State had 
“adequately protected” his “inchoate interest in establishing a relationship 
with Jessica.”191 The Court’s understanding of Lerhr’s interest as 
“inchoate” was key to its analysis. The Court reasoned that “the rights of 
. . . parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed,” 
insinuating that paternal rights only stem from paternal actions.192 The 
 
180 Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_ (#Y_%). 
181 Id. at W]Y-$X. 
182 Id. at W$X. Importantly, “[t]he dispute did not concern the qualifications of Mr. 
Robertson as Jessica’s adoptive father.” Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of 
Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, ]$ OHIO ST. L.J. %#%, %#] (#Y_]). 
183 Lehr, ]O% U.S. at W$X. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at W$%. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at W$X-$#. 
189 Id. at WOW n.#_. 
190 Id. at W$$. Lehr was never “shown to be unqualified to exercise parental 
responsibilities and rights.” Buchanan, supra note #_W, at %#]. 
191 Lehr, ]O% U.S. at WO$. 
192 Id. at W$P. 
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Court homed in on what it perceived as a paucity of paternal actions on 
Lehr’s part, noting that he had never lived with Jessica or Lorraine, never 
assisted them financially, and never offered to marry Lorraine.193 
Accordingly, his relationship did not acquire the “substantial protection 
under the Due Process Clause” which “an unwed father [who] demonstrates 
a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood” earns.194 The Court 
reiterated that constitutional protection could not be earned by “the mere 
existence of a biological link,”195 but conceded that its earlier unwed father 
cases did not allow for the application of laws like New York’s where “the 
mother and father are in fact similarly situated.”196 
When the Court next considered the case of an unwed father, its task 
was not nearly as simple. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court rejected 
the due process claims of an unwed man seeking to establish his paternity 
of a child he claimed to have conceived with a married woman.197 Under 
the relevant California law, children born to married women living with 
their husbands were presumed to be the biological—and, for all intents, 
legal—products of that union.198 Only the husband or wife could rebut that 
presumption under the state law.199 A four-justice plurality of the Court 
rested its decision on “the absence of any constitutionally protected right 
to legal parentage on the part of . . . adulterous natural father[s],” and 
rejected the due process challenge of Michael, the putative natural 
father.200 
Michael had had an affair with his neighbor, Carole, who was married 
to Gerald.201 Carole gave birth to a daughter, Victoria, and confided in 
Michael that he may be Victoria’s biological father.202 Throughout the 
first three years of her life, Victoria lived with Carole.203 After that time, 
Carole had blood tests taken that demonstrated a Y_.XP% probability that 
Michael was Victoria’s biological father.204 Months later, Carole and 
Victoria visited Michael in St. Thomas, where “Michael held Victoria out 
as his child.”205 After two months, Carole left with Victoria, started living 
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with another man in California,206 and began rebuffing Michael’s attempts 
to visit Victoria.207 Michael subsequently filed an action to establish his 
paternity of Victoria and gain visitation rights, but Carole and Michael 
then reconciled before the suit was ultimately decided.208 Michael then 
lived with Carole and Victoria for an eight-month stretch, except for when 
he was abroad for business.209 During that time, Carole and Michael 
signed a stipulation agreeing that Michael was Victoria’s natural father.210 
Carole later left Michael, rejoined Gerald, to whom she was still married, 
and instructed her lawyers not to file the stipulation.211 By the time the 
Supreme Court decided the case five years later, Carole, Gerald, and 
Victoria were living together.212 
California’s law was based on an intent to protect the integrity of a 
marital relationship.213 Michael asserted a violation of his substantive due 
process rights because that interest, in his view, was inadequate to 
terminate the parent-child relationship that he had formed with Victoria.214 
As the plurality noted, that argument was “predicated on the assertion that 
Michael ha[d] a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his 
relationship with Victoria.”215 But the plurality viewed Stanley, Quilloin, 
Caban, and Lehr as resting on “the historic respect . . . traditionally 
accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family.”216 
Accordingly, the plurality limited its inquiry to whether individuals 
similarly situated to Michael and Victoria had historically “been treated as 
a protected family unit.”217 The plurality ruled that they had not, and noted 
that, in fact, the marital unit—here comprised of Gerald, Carole, and 
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such, the plurality held that it was not unconstitutional for a state to give 
preference to a husband over a putative biological father in establishing 
paternity.219 
The plurality’s reasoning did not command a majority of the Court. 
Justice Stevens, writing separately and concurring in the judgment, 
rejected the plurality’s contention that a parent–child relationship of a 
constitutionally protectable nature could never develop between an unwed 
father with a child born to a married mother.220 Justice Stevens’s 
concurrence relied on the narrower contention that the California statute’s 
allowance of a court, in its discretion, to grant visitation rights to any 
person with an interest in a child’s welfare effectively protected Michael’s 
due process rights because the California courts undertook that analysis.221 
The concurrence left the Court’s biology plus jurisprudence intact, but 
with no clearly discernable formulation of its continued utility beyond the 
precise contours of the facts adduced in the cases the Court had already 
decided. 
The erratic nature of the biology plus case law reflects what the Court 
has characterized as the “lurking problems” inherent in cases concerning 
“proof of paternity.”222 But despite the relatively concentrated period in 
which the Court expanded, reified, and curtailed the custodial rights of 
unwed fathers, the Court’s biology plus cases fit a broader pattern of the 
Court inscribing the parameters of parental rights. Nearly half a century 
before Stanley, the Court recognized an individual right to “establish a 
home and bring up children” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
 
automatic correlate of a biological tie” (footnote omitted)) [hereinafter Dolgin, Just a Gene]; David 
D. Meyers, The Constitutionality of Best Interests Parentage, #] WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. _$P, 
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The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, #XW COLUM. L. REV. %%P, %$X (WXXW) 
(“There is widespread confusion about families in general and especially about children and the 
implications for children of the ‘modern’ conception of adults within families as autonomous 
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[hereinafter Dolgin, Family Arbiter]. 
219 Michael H., ]Y# U.S. at #WY. 
220 Id. at #%% (Stevens, J., concurring). Four other justices also rejected this proposition. 
Id. at #%O (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Process Clause.223 Just a few years later, it clarified that that right 
encompassed “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing 
and education of children under their control.”224 This right existed 
primarily in parents, with states only permitted a subsidiary interest in the 
“custody, care and nurture” of children.225 
The process of acknowledging parental rights continued in tandem 
with Stanley and its progeny, but it increasingly imparted a view of 
parenthood unmoored from biology. The Court acknowledged that “the 
usual understanding of ‘family’ implies biological relationships,” but 
reasoned that “biological relationships are not exclusive determination of 
the existence of a family.”226 In accordance with that view, its biology 
plus case law increasingly shuttered the parental rights of biological 
fathers unable to demonstrate their participation in a family unit bound 
by more than genetic ties. Central to these cases was the Court’s 
conclusion that actions, and not mere biology, were necessary for unwed 
fathers to have their paternal rights afforded constitutional protection.227 
In Stanley, the Court saw a man who had acted as a primary caregiver and 
was wrongly divested of his parental rights.228 In Quilloin, the Court saw 
the opposite. But in both cases, the Court applied subjective standards to 
facts, etching a fact-centric notion of protectable paternal interests in the 
process. 
Those interests were forged in the context of a broader reorientation of 
gender roles in the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court had long cast women 
in a singularly domestic sphere, portraying them as “the center of home 
and family life”229 even in the midst of “vast changes in the[ir] social and 
legal position[s].”230 The biology plus cases were primary disrupting 
forces in that myopic narrative, giving legal credence to the employ of men 
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in traditionally maternal caregiving roles. But the Court’s commitment to 
shedding the gendered trapping of tradition has wavered at times as its 
opinions have embraced gender roles to sanction differences in the 
unequal burdens placed on the assumption of parental rights by men and 
women.231 And even where the caregiving role of fathers is clear, the Court 
has impeded their assertions of parental rights.232 To the extent that 
Adoptive Couple fits within the Court’s biology plus jurisprudence, it too 
may stand for a strained view of what the proper course for asserting 
paternal rights entails. 
IV. CONSIDERING STATE LAW INCORPORATION:  
A THRESHOLD ISSUE 
ICWA is mired and buoyed by its interpretations, with expansive 
readings of its provisions giving weight to Congress’s protectionist 
inclinations and narrow readings evincing the role that judicial discretion 
still plays in cabining American Indians’ rights.233 The lack of a federal 
definition for “acknowledged or established” raises the question of 
whether such an issue of family law is better left for the states to determine. 
This Part briefly considers states’ methods for determining paternity 
before considering the implications of wholesale adoptions of those 
definitions into ICWA. 
A. Paternity by State 
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act requires states to create and enforce 
procedures for establishing paternity as a condition for receiving federal funds 
for child support and welfare programs.234 Under Title IV-D, states must 
 
231 See Nguyen v. INS, $%% U.S. $%, $O-$P, P% (WXX#) (upholding a statute that “imposes 
different requirements for [a] child’s acquisition of citizenship depending upon whether the 
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#$X, #P]-P$ (WX#P) (distinguishing Nguyen and invalidating a physical presence requirement’s 
“gender-based distinction” in a citizenship statute). 
232 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, $]W U.S. #, #P-#_ (WXX]) (denying 
standing to a father attempting to assert a First Amendment claim on behalf of his child 
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“regularly and frequently publicize . . . the availability and encourage the use 
of procedures for voluntary establishment of paternity.”235 Those procedures 
also include the ability to locate parents for purposes of “enforcing child 
support obligations, or making or enforcing a child custody or visitation 
determination.”236 
Under the law, states are required to have “[e]xpedited administrative 
and judicial procedures” in place to establish paternity.237 States must also 
have procedures permitting a father to establish paternity of his child at 
any point before the child turns eighteen.238 Title IV-D also provides, in 
cases of contested paternity, for relevant parties to undergo genetic testing 
unless certain conditions are not met.239 For positive results, states are 
required to enact “[p]rocedures which create a rebuttable or, at the option 
of the State, conclusive presumption of paternity upon genetic testing 
results indicating a threshold probability that the alleged father is the father 
of the child.”240 For voluntary acknowledgments, states must provide an 
affidavit process and fully recognize valid affidavits signed in other 
states.241 Putative fathers must be afforded “a reasonable opportunity to 
initiate a paternity action.”242 
This regime of biology-dependent paternity determinations and the 
unfurling of states’ marital-minded parenthood orthodoxy post-Stanley has 
resulted in states adopting laws far more permissive towards and protective 
of paternal rights than that mandated by the Supreme Court.243 But the 
prevalence of states conferring paternal rights through determinations of 
“biology is in fact a far more fragile and insecure system of parental 
opportunity” where biology begets the convenience of claiming paternal 
rights, but does not guarantee their instantaneous acquisition.244 For many 
states, that opportunity is fairly consistent with the language of ICWA. 
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Indeed, that language is nearly identical to that of more than a dozen state 
laws that addressed issues of paternity at the time of ICWA’s enactment.245 
Similarly, many states now provide presumptions in favor of 
biological and legal paternity in instances where an unwed putative 
father, in conjunction with the child’s mother, attests to his paternity 
through a formal state procedure.246 Other states forgo the formal 
requirement, mandating, like ICWA, that a putative father need only 
affirmatively acknowledge their paternity.247 In all, twenty-five states 
permit voluntary paternal acknowledgments through paternity registries, 
twenty-one allow acknowledgment through court affidavit, twenty-six 
permit paternity establishment through voluntary consent to 
identification on a birth certificate, and forty-one states permit court-
ordered genetic testing to resolve paternity claims.248 
B. Rejecting Wholesale Incorporation 
The perceived wisdom of state law tending to define family structure 
absent extraordinary circumstances seemingly compels the incorporation 
of states’ paternity laws in § #YX%(Y).249 That same wisdom has led to the 
incorporation of state law definitions in federal statutes bearing on family 
relations. In De Sylva v. Ballentine, the Supreme Court opted to defer to 
states’ definitions of “children” for purposes of the federal Copyright Act 
of #Y]P.250 The Court reasoned that “the scope of a federal right is, of 
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course, a federal question, but that does not mean that its content is not to 
be determined by state, rather than federal law.”251 The Court further 
explained that “[t]his is especially true where a statute deals with a familial 
relationship; there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is 
primarily a matter of state concern.”252 The De Sylva Court’s use of state 
law was characteristic of the federal courts’ approach to issues of family 
law at the time.253 
However, such deference undercuts the uniformity sought by ICWA254 
and risks a relapse of the state court obstruction which the Act sought to 
quell.255 In fact, it may add to the disunity which already exists.256 It would 
also allow for the value judgments that animated Congress’s enactment of 
ICWA to befall the unwed fathers who attempt to establish parenthood under 
the Act.257 
But beyond the policy risks which allowing for only state law 
incorporation may entail, incorporation is also undercut by common 
practices in statutory interpretation and the Supreme Court’s precedent in 
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interpreting ICWA’s provisions. This is evident in the Court’s declaration 
in Jerome v. United States that “in the absence of a plain indication to the 
contrary,” the Court “generally assume[s] . . . that Congress when it enacts 
a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state 
law.”258 The Court reiterated this principle of statutory construction in 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, its first case to deal with 
ICWA.259 In Holyfield, the Court considered “whether there is any reason 
to believe that Congress intended the ICWA definition of ‘domicile’ to be 
a matter of state law.”260 It answered in the negative. In doing so, the Court 
noted that its presumption against reliance on state law by Congress is 
made “in light of the object and policy of the statute” at issue.261 The Court 
found the object and policy of ICWA to be at odds with a rendering of it 
as “a statute under which different rules apply from time to time to the 
same child, simply as a result of his or her transport from one State to 
another.”262 A similar recognition of Congress’s intention to create a 
“uniform federal” law should weigh in favor of eschewing strictly state-
law-based incorporation into the definition of “acknowledged or 
established” under § #YX%(Y).263 
As a matter of statutory construction, the absence of a reference to state 
law in § #YX%(Y) is revealing. The Act often explicitly refers to state law for 
purposes of delineating where its application is intended. For example, § 
#Y#%(b) of the Act permits parents and Indian custodians to withdraw their 
“consent to a foster care placement under State law” to facilitate the return of 
their children.264 No such invocation of state law is present in § #YX%(Y). In 
contrast, “State law” is expressly included in the definition of “Indian 
custodian,” merely three subsections before the definition of “parent.”265  
An incorporation of state law in the context of § #YX%(Y) would also run 
counter to clear Court precedent rejecting the application of state laws in 
the context of legislation concerning Indian affairs.266 That precedent has 
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repeatedly recognized the independence of tribes from state laws in 
matters of “social relations”267—of which determinations of paternity 
surely qualify. A contrary determination would only serve to spawn “the 
vagaries of the laws of the several states”268 in place of the uniform Act. 
However, this reality must necessarily be reconciled with the Supreme 
Court’s repeated instruction that congressional legislation in the realm of 
Indian affairs should be liberally construed in favor of the American 
Indians to whom it applies.269 In that respect, state laws, as discussed 
above, are often far more protective of paternal rights—and receptive to 
claims of paternity—than the Court’s biology plus cases. The paternity 
recognition methods currently utilized by states—including birth 
certificates, paternity tests, court affidavits, and paternity registries—
also offer sensible approaches to satisfying § #YX%(Y)’s “acknowledged 
or established” language. For these reasons, where enough time has 
passed for a putative father to develop a constitutionally protectable 
relationship with his American Indian child, but where that father has not 
met state law paternity requirements consistent with § #YX%(Y)’s text and 
the Act’s protectionist tilt, a state court should next consider whether the 
putative father, consistent with the Court’s biology plus jurisprudence, 
has developed a parent–child relationship sufficient for due process 
protections to attach.270 In this sense, the constitutional law emanating 
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from the Court’s biology plus doctrine is “interstitial,”271 patching the 
gaps that may exist between state law and constitutionally protected 
paternal interests.272 
Such applications of § #YX%(Y) must also take place with the recognition 
that ICWA and the federal government’s trust responsibilities to American 
Indians involve “uniquely federal interests”273 which may require the 
displacement of state law. In those instances where too little time has passed 
between an American Indian child’s birth and the assertion of paternity in 
a child custody proceeding by the child’s unwed putative father, and where 
the father is granted no paternal rights under state law, a determination of 
paternity must be made independent of state law and with regard to 
reasonable interpretations of “acknowledged or established.” The 
specifications of that interpretation stretch beyond the scope of this 
Comment, which focuses on the reach of “acknowledged or established” in 
instances where putative fathers have had an opportunity to develop 
meaningful relationships with their children. However, the Court’s decision 
in Holyfield rejects the notion that custody itself is required for paternity to 
be established or acknowledged under § #YX%(Y). In Holyfield, the Court 
stated that ICWA “cannot be applied so as automatically to reward those 
who obtain custody, whether lawfully or otherwise, and maintain it during 
any ensuing (and protracted) litigation.”274 This suggests that the mere 
denial, purposeful or otherwise, of custody to unwed fathers immediately 
following their child’s birth is insufficient to bar their later assumption of 
parenthood status under § #YX%(Y). 
 
include the federal definition of ‘parent’ that excludes the unwed father where paternity has not 
been established or acknowledged.”). 
271 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, $] COLUM. 
L. REV. ]_Y, ]Y_ (#Y$]). 
272 The application of state law here is a prudential one that in no way defeats the purpose 
of the Act. State courts have routinely held that state procedural requirements inconsistent with 
the purpose and text of ICWA are displaced by the Act. See, e.g., In re A.O., _YO N.W.Wd O$W, 
O$$-$O (S.D. WX#P) (holding that a trial court’s denial of a parent and tribe’s request for transfer 
as untimely was improper because it failed to account for the considerations mandated by the 
Act in instances of transfer); In re J.J.T., No. XY-#P-XX#OW-CV, WX#P WL O$XO]X$ (Tex. App. WX#P) 
(holding that a state “procedural rule which would deny the right to intervene in a child custody 
proceeding because the tribe did not file a written pleading prior to the hearing” is invalid in an 
ICWA-governed proceeding). State paternity laws inconsistent with the Act’s “acknowledged or 
established language” would be similarly displaced.  
273 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., ]$# U.S. O%X, O]X (#Y_X). 
274 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, ]YX U.S. %X, $] (#Y_Y) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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V. FASHIONING A STANDARD 
This Part outlines the often nebulous standard the Supreme Court has 
utilized in its biology plus cases. It begins by considering the rationale for 
interpreting § #YX%(Y) through the use of a biology plus framework. It then 
explores the contours of that framework, explicating its discernible principles 
in the process. 
A. A Constitutional Imperative 
The rooting of an “acknowledged or established” definition within 
the Court’s biology plus framework is supported by the legislative 
history of the Act. The House Report accompanying the Act explicitly 
notes that § #YX%(Y)’s definition of “parent” “is not meant to conflict with 
the decision of the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois.”275 Accordingly, 
Congress intended to align its definition of “parent” with the Court’s 
Stanley doctrine, effectively conferring congressional sanction to impart 
the biology plus notion of parenthood into the statute.276 Indeed, the 
Court’s conception of a protectable relationship between an unmarried 
father and his biological child is consonant with § #YX%(Y)’s 
acknowledge-or-establish language. The adoption of a biology plus 
framework is also supported by ICWA’s explicit mention of Congress’s 
intention to create “minimum federal standards,”277 as the biology plus 
standard utilized in Stanley and its progeny etches the minimum that an 
unwed father must do to achieve a constitutionally protectable 
relationship with his child. 
In rejecting calls for it to promulgate regulations giving a specific 
definition to “parent” under § #YX%(Y), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 
adopted this understanding as well. It recognized that the “Supreme Court 
and subsequent case law has already articulated a constitutional standard 
regarding the rights of unwed fathers.”278 That standard, the constitutional 
baseline by which the rights of unwed fathers gain constitutional protection, 
is the minimum federal standard. In articulating that position, the BIA 
 
275 H.R. REP. NO. Y$-#%_O, at W# (#YP_). In Stanley, the Court inextricably linked the 
termination of parental rights to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
requiring states to provide hearings to determine individuals’ fitness as parents before their 
parental rights can be terminated. ]X$ U.S. O]$, O]Y (#YPW); see supra notes #]%–#$] and 
accompanying text. 
276 Analogs in congressional awareness of judicial precedent can regularly be found 
throughout federal criminal common law. See generally Frank Easterbrook, The Case of the 
Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, ##W HARV. L. REV. #Y#% (#YYY). 
277 W$ U.S.C. § #YXW (WX#W). 
278 Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, _# Fed. Reg. %_,PP_, %_,POY (June #], WX#O) (to 
be codified at W$ C.F.R. pt. W%). 
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favorably cited the Alaska Supreme Court’s recognition that other courts 
have interpreted Stanley to mean that an unmarried father who “manifests an 
interest in developing a relationship with [his] child cannot constitutionally 
be denied parental status based solely on the failure to comply with the 
technical requirements for establishing paternity.”279 The BIA’s 
understanding of the settled nature of “acknowledged or established” in 
ICWA following Stanley implicitly reflects an acknowledgment of the 
biology plus standard as governing their interpretation.280 
That interpretation is similarly buttressed by the approach to 
interpreting ICWA first utilized by the Court in Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield. In Holyfield, the Court found it “helpful 
to borrow established common-law principles of domicile to the extent 
that they are not inconsistent with the objectives of the congressional 
scheme.”281 Here, too, the common law provides a pertinent analog in 
the holding out doctrine through which social fatherhood, as 
established by social conduct of a parental nature, is held to confer 
parental rights.282 
To comport with the requirements of the holding out doctrine—and 
“hold out” a child to the world as one’s biological offspring—a man must 
regularly engage in acts such as “changing the child’s diapers; feeding him; 
taking him to the doctor; bathing him; . . . and providing or building a loving 
relationship with [his] child.”283 The doctrine is rooted in a respect and 
formal acknowledgment of the acts deemed to connote parenthood in a 
 
279 Bruce L. v. W.E., W]P P.%d YOO, YP_ (Alaska WX##) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
280 The prior year, the BIA issued interim guidelines suggesting that unwed fathers 
“need only take reasonable steps to establish or acknowledge paternity” in order to satisfy 
the definition of “parent” under ICWA. Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian 
Child Custody Proceedings, _X Fed. Reg. #X#]O, #X#$# (Feb. W$, WX#$). 
281 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, ]YX U.S. %X, ]P-]_ (#Y_Y). 
282 Dowd, supra note #%_, at Y#_. Though a product of common law, the doctrine has been 
embedded in state statutory law as well. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § O%-Y-%#X(A)($) (WX#Y) 
(mandating paternal consent by unwed fathers for adoptions of their children “placed with the 
prospective adoptive parents six months or less after the child’s birth” only when a father has 
“openly lived with the child or the child’s mother for a continuous period of six months 
immediately preceding the placement of the child for adoption, and the father openly held 
himself out to be the father of the child during the six months period”). The holding out doctrine 
has also been applied in other contexts. See, e.g., Case Note, Partnership by Estoppel Based on 
a Holding Out by One Other Than the Party Sought to Be Held—Borocato v. Serio, % MD. L. 
REV. #_Y (#Y%Y) (describing a court’s use of the holding out doctrine to determine that a business 
relationship existed). 
283 Niccol D. Kording, Little White Lies That Destroy Children’s Lives—Recreating Paternity 
Fraud Laws to Protect Children’s Interests, O J.L. & FAM. STUD. W%P, W]]-]$ (WXX]). Compare 
Dowd, supra note #%_, at Y#Y (criticizing the holding out doctrine as “root[ed] in patriarchal 
privilege”), with Hendricks, supra note WW#, at ]%# (describing the Court’s biology plus cases, which 
essentially incorporate the holding out doctrine, as “elevat[ing] the rights of men . . . by defining 
parenthood in terms of motherhood and making fatherhood fit a female model”). 
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private setting that, when conferred to the world, also connote it to the public 
generally.284 The Court’s cases dealing with parental rights have expressed 
broad support for such a rationale,285 often invoking it as a natural right.286 
A federal standard for “acknowledged or established” under § #YX%(Y) 
is similarly supported by practical considerations stemming from the 
Court’s resolution of the issues involved in Adoptive Couple. Though the 
Court did not pass upon the proper interpretation of § #YX%(Y)’s language 
regarding unwed fathers, it essentially constrained any effective 
constructions of “acknowledged or established”—at least for purposes of 
invoking the procedural protections of § #Y#W(d) and § #Y#W(f)287—to those 
consistent with biology plus case law by imposing custodial requirements 
on the Act’s active efforts and parental rights termination provisions. 
Accordingly, in the wake of Adoptive Couple, some courts have dispensed 
with discussions of § #YX%(Y) with regard to unwed fathers, finding it 
unnecessary to consider where no familial relationship exists sufficient for 
a putative father to invoke § #Y#W(d) and § #Y#W(f).288 
 
284 This aspect of the holding out doctrine is significant for its parallels to characteristics 
often ascribed to nuclear families. See Ristroph & Murray, supra note WWP, at #W$O-$P (“The 
marital, nuclear family is one that encourages . . . a certain kind of visibility . . . mean[ing] that 
the state has encouraged the view that public recognition as a family is something to be prized.”). 
285 The Court has often given the holding out doctrine an implicit sanction. In Michael H., a 
plurality of the Court noted that Gerald D., whose paternity claim it gave constitutional sanction 
over that of the child’s biological father, “was listed as father on the birth certificate and has always 
held Victoria out to the world as his daughter.” Michael H. v. Gerald D., ]Y# U.S. ##X, ##%-#] (#Y_Y) 
(plurality opinion). And in Lehr, the New York law which the Court upheld against a constitutional 
challenge provided for notice of adoption proceedings to “those who live openly with the child and 
the child’s mother and who hold themselves out to be the father.” Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_, 
W$# (#Y_%). 
286 See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, ]%# U.S. _#O, _]$ 
(#YPP) (“[T]he liberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily 
to be sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Buchanan, 
supra note #_W, at %W% (“That the Constitution particularly protects the custodial rights of 
biological parents who perform custodial responsibilities has been stated as a fact and 
explained in terms of traditional and natural right.”). Despite those notions of 
superconstitutionality, the Court has repeatedly construed those rights in constitutional terms. 
See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, WOW U.S. %YX, %YY (#YW%) (situating parental rights within the 
liberty interests guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment). Accordingly, the analysis below 
proceeds in constitutional terms. 
287 In dicta, the Court strongly suggested that its statutory approach was equally 
applicable to the continued custody requirements in § #Y#W(e) and § #Y#W(f). See Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl, $PX U.S. O%P, O$W (WX#%) (“Our interpretation of § #Y#W(d) is also 
confirmed by the provision’s placement next to §§ #Y#W(e) and (f) . . . . That these three 
provisions appear adjacent to each other strongly suggests that . . . ‘breakup of the Indian 
family’ should be read in harmony with the ‘continued custody’ requirement.”). 
288 See, e.g., In re P.T.D., ]W] P.%d O#Y, OW%-W] (Mont. WX#_) (noting that § #Y#W ICWA 
provisions do not apply in the case of a putative father who “has had no meaningful contact . . . 
and has not established any relationship” without first considering whether he is a “parent” under 
§ #YX%(Y)). 
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An interpretation of § #YX%(Y) consistent with biology plus principles 
is necessary lest its language become mere surplusage. The definitional 
gap presented by § #YX%(Y)’s text only calls for “the normal judicial filling 
of statutory interstices.”289 But that filling need not invoke the machineries 
of judicial policymaking in the normal sense. The Court need only make 
clear what Congress made readily apparent from ICWA’s text and 
structure: the federal minimum standard of the Constitution applies.290 
B. Articulating a Standard 
The Court has been vague at times in describing when constitutional 
protections attach to unwed fathers’ attempts to claim legal paternal 
rights.291 The difficulty in culling a workable standard from the Court’s 
biology plus cases is a product of the cases often representing the 
extremes of exercises in paternal effort.292 Still, the standard, once 
applied, is rigidly inapposite to the liminal determinations of paternity 
which its opacity seems to invite.293 But despite the generalities by which 
 
289 Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie – And of the New Federal Common Law, %Y N.Y.U. 
L. REV. %_%, ]W# (#YO]). 
290 This approach is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s admonishments against 
placing congressional purpose above statutory text in interpreting statutes. See, e.g., Bd. of 
Governors, of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., ]P] U.S. %O#, %P] (#Y_O) 
(“Invocations of the ‘plain purpose’ of legislation at the expense of the terms of the statute itself 
takes no account of the [legislative] process of compromise.”). Rather, the purpose—creation of 
federal minimum standards—is embedded within ICWA’s text and necessarily colors its judicial 
interpretation as well. 
291 See Sylvain, supra note #]#, at _]X (noting that the Court did not “identify[] discernible 
boundaries to the ‘substantial relationship’ test” in Caban). 
292 See David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless 
Father, ]# ARIZ. L. REV. P$%, PO% (#YYY) (noting that “the Court’s cases seem to contemplate 
only two models of fatherhood: the man of virtue who is integrally involved in the rearing of his 
children and the scofflaw who has slept on his rights while others changed diapers and read 
bedtime stories”). 
293 See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of 
Caregiving and Caregivers, Y] VA. L. REV. %_$, %Y_-YY (WXX_) (“The law effectively has 
constructed a parent/stranger dichotomy in which one is either a parent, vested with the rights 
and responsibilities of caregiving, or one is a legal stranger without legal entitlements or 
obligations.”); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Has Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to 
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, P_ GEO. 
L.J. ]$Y, ]P# (#YYX) (“Customarily, legal parenthood is an all-or-nothing status. A parent has all 
of the obligation of parenthood and all of the rights; a nonparent has none of the obligations 
and none of the rights.”). At one point there was the possibility that a case such as Michael H., 
where Justice Stevens’s decisive fifth vote “left Michael with the right to petition for visitation, 
regardless of whether he could be declared ‘the father’”, Hendricks, supra note WW#, at ]]Y, 
would broker a middle ground. But since deciding Michael H., the Court has struck down one 
statute which, similar to the California visitation law applicable to Michael, provided for 
visitation rights to a nonparent. Troxel v. Granville, $%X U.S. $P (WXXX). This has cast doubt on 
the continued validity of a more moderate approach. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding 
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the Court has dictated unwed biological fathers’ rights, some discernible 
elements of their protected paternal interests have been elucidated. 
The Court’s conception of paternal—and parental—rights is one 
presaged on preexisting parent–child relationships both within the context 
of ICWA, as evinced by Adoptive Couple, and its general biology plus 
jurisprudence. The cases so far reveal that “the mere existence of a 
biological link does not merit . . . constitutional protection.”294 Similarly, 
“[r]andom gifts and visits by [a] biological parent are not sufficient to 
establish a familial relationship.”295 But unwed fathers’ “fundamental 
liberty interest . . . in the care, custody, and management of their 
child[ren]” is not felled by their mere failure as “model parents” or even 
the temporary lapse of custodial rights.296 Rather, it fails when there is no 
relationship to dissolve. 
However, in the context of ICWA, a “familial relationship” standard 
which solely adheres to the markers of family development present in 
traditional, nuclear families297 is inadequate and contrary to congressional 
intention.298 Instead, the standard must adapt to the cultural norms which 
ICWA was intended to protect, recognizing that the Court’s biology plus 
framework was not fashioned in the ICWA context. But the Court’s family 
jurisprudence is not anathema to “a larger conception of the family.”299 If 
 
Principles for Picking Parents, PW HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. %W%, %WP (WXX]) (“Troxel makes it clear 
that ‘parents’ are constitutionally protected against inappropriate intervention in their families 
by nonparents, but it does nothing to limit how states may define parents and thus little to limit 
developments of the functional parent trend.”). The functional parenthood idea referenced by 
Bartholet “emphasiz[es] the daily, routine, and even mundane aspects of everyday parenting.” 
Jacobs, supra note #$], at #YP; see also AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § W.X% (WXXX) (encouraging a view of functional 
parenthood). But see Michael R. Clisham & Robin Fretwell Wilson, American Law Institute’s 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding Principles 
or Obligatory Footnote?, ]W FAM. L.Q. $P% (WXX_) (questioning the relevance of the ALI’s 
recommendations). 
294 Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_, WO# (#Y_%).; Daniel V. Zinman, Note, Father Knows Best: 
The Unwed Father’s Right to Raise His Infant Surrendered for Adoption, OX FORDHAM L. REV. 
YP#, YP#-PW (#YYW) (interpreting the Court’s unwed father cases to stand for the proposition that “a 
natural father’s right to veto the adoption of his child does not derive from a biological link alone: 
it must be accompanied by an existing parental relationship with his child”). 
295 Dallas, supra note #%Y, at %P%. 
296 Santosky v. Kramer, ]$$ U.S. P]$, P$% (#Y_W). 
297 See Dolgin, Family Arbiter, supra note W#_, at %]W (describing the “nuclear family” as 
“composed of a working husband-father, a stay-at-home wife-mother, and their children”). 
298 However, “preferences for nuclear families alone does not explain the unwed father 
cases” and is therefore unnecessary to consider in fashioning a biology plus test under § #YX%(Y). 
Hendricks, supra note WW#, at ]]$; id. at ]]_ (“The Court’s emphasis on cohabitation between 
father and child seems driven more by its interest in daily caretaking than by loyalty to the nuclear 
family.”). 
299 Moore v. E. Cleveland, ]%# U.S. ]Y], $X$ (#YPP) (plurality opinion). 
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anything, it embraces it.300 Its recognition of the nature and importance of 
acknowledging protections which should be afforded to extended families 
may serve as a helpful guide for courts grappling with how to weigh the 
contributions of unwed fathers which will be sufficient to establish a 
parental right cognizable under the Constitution, and ICWA as a result. 
It has been suggested that “familial acts”—“prototypically” those 
that resemble “the development of a spousal or spouse-like relationship 
between a father and his child’s mother”—are the only type that pass 
muster under the Court’s unwed father precedent.301 However, such a 
construction of the biology plus standard in the context of ICWA would 
conflict with Congress’s recognition of American Indians engaged in “a 
cultural tradition in which networked caregiving, rather than 
autonomous parental caregiving is the norm.”302  
The Court’s biology plus precedent has also been understood to 
“suggest[] that the most important factor in determining whether a 
genetic father will be entitled to constitutional protection of his parental 
rights is his relationship with the mother.”303 The application of a 
standard permitting a court to weigh a mother’s opinion in a 
determination of a putative father’s parental rights brings with it a host 
of concerns about the ability of unwed fathers to develop the 
“substantial relationship” which the Court’s jurisprudence gives 
constitutional protection.304 In Lehr, the Court did not acknowledge the 
parental rights of a father who had been deceived as to his biological 
child’s whereabouts by her birth mother.305 Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
 
300 See id. at $X$ n.#$ (acknowledging that the Court has previously vested constitutional 
protection in the caregiving rights of an aunt in the absence of the “natural parents”). 
301 Dolgin, Just a Gene, supra note W#_, at OPW. 
302 Melissa Murray, Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving 
and Caregivers, Y] VA. L. REV. %_$, ]WW (WXX_); see also Graham, supra note %], at $ (“For 
many Native American nations, ‘family’ denotes extensive kinship networks that reach far 
beyond the Western nuclear family.”); McCartney, supra note ]_, at $]O (“In the American 
Indian culture, the rights of the extended family in its children are just as real and important as 
parental rights.”); Woodward, supra note $X, at %_-%Y (#YP$) (“In the extended family, the child-
rearing functions are typically distributed beyond the sphere of the non-Indian family nucleus 
(mother, father, and siblings) so that grandparents, uncles, aunts, and other relatives and even 
friends within the tribal community often share the responsibilities and joys of bringing up the 
children.”). 
303 Katherine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology?: The History and Future of Paternity Law 
and Parental Status, #] CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y #, %] (WXX]). 
304 See Woodhouse, supra note #, at #PYP n.WW# (“[M]others have the power, in practice, to 
prevent fathers from receiving notice by refusing to disclose their identity, and the power to 
prevent them from actually developing a relationship by preventing contact.”). 
305 Lehr v. Robertson, ]O] U.S. W]_, WOW (White, J., dissenting). But see id. at WO$ n.W% 
(majority opinion) (rejecting the dissent’s characterization and noting that “[t]here is no 
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in Adoptive Couple, in which he emphasized that the case did not 
“involve special circumstances such as a father who was deceived about 
the existence of the child or a father who was prevented from supporting 
his child,” casts significant doubt on whether the Court would so readily 
accept such an outcome in the context of ICWA.306 
But interpretations of the Court’s biology plus jurisprudence which cast 
the Court as consigning the rights of unwed fathers to the judgments of their 
children’s mothers reflect a misunderstanding of the Court’s consideration 
of biological mothers’ perceptions in determining the parental rights of 
biological fathers.307 In Stanley, the Court’s seminal biology plus case, the 
Court did not endeavor to take into account the views of the mother of Peter 
Stanley’s children when determining his constitutionally protected parental 
rights, as she was deceased. Rather, the Court looked to the role which he 
played in his children’s lives. As the Court took great pains to explain, his 
role was that of a primary caregiver, akin to a single mother. Accordingly, 
“stereotypical maternal” acts of child rearing, and “not merely begetting,” 
are those that render an unwed father’s actions sufficient to pass the Court’s 
biology plus test.308 
That test has often taken the form of a traditional “best interest” 
analysis.309 Long a standard in family law proceedings involving issues 
 
suggestion in the record that appellee engaged in fraudulent practices that led appellant not to 
protect his rights”). 
306 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, $PX U.S. O%P, OOP (WX#%) (Breyer, J., concurring); see 
also Dale, supra note O, at %O# n.W_ (“The Supreme Court cases have not definitively answered 
the question of what happens constitutionally in the context of a putative father who is unable 
to develop a relationship with a natural child through no fault of his own.”). At least one state 
court has held that Adoptive Couple is inapplicable when a birth father has been deceived by his 
biological child’s biological mother about the birth and whereabouts of the child. See E.T. v. 
R.K.B. (In re B.B.), ]#P P.%d #, %W n.%] (Utah WX#P) (describing Adoptive Couple as “no 
controlling precedent on the precise issue before this court”). This is consistent with similar state 
court rulings prior to Adoptive Couple. See, e.g., Noah v. Kelly B., OP P.%d %$Y, %OO n.## (Okla. 
Civ. App. WXX%) (“[A] father may assert paternity, and all rights associated therewith, when the 
true facts have been withheld from him.”). Notably, the Court in Adoptive Couple did not confine 
its reading of § #Y#W(f)’s safeguards for parental rights termination decisions to apply only where 
a parent had physical custody of their child. See Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O$X (“Biological 
Father should not have been able to invoke § #Y#W(f) in this case, because he had never had legal 
or physical custody of Baby Girl as of the time of the adoption proceedings.”). Accordingly, 
though physical custody of the child may be sufficient for purposes of demonstrating the paternal 
actions sufficient to establish that an unwed father is a “parent” under § #YX%(Y), it is not 
necessary to invoke ICWA’s substantive protections for the termination of parental rights where 
legal custody, pursuant to state law, exists. 
307 See Hendricks, supra note WW#, at ]]P (“As a matter of doctrine, the Court did not hold 
that unwed fathers were protected when and because they were similar to married fathers; they 
were protected when and because they were similar to biological mothers.”). 
308 Id. 
309 The best interest test has been described as follows: 
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of custody and child welfare, the best interest standard “illustrates the 
ability of nineteenth- and twentieth-century family law to solidify, though 
generally not to design, social mores.”310 In Quilloin, the Court utilized 
the standard and “considered the effect of a continued relationship on the 
child above the interest of the unwed father.”311 
But the best interest standard embedded in ICWA is akin to earlier 
articulations of family law in which parental rights were fundamental.312 
The “best interests of Indian Children” proposition set forth in ICWA is 
one consonant with “the stability and security of Indian tribes and 
families.”313 The typical best interest analysis incorporates no such 
consideration of broader societal interests.314 However, ICWA “is based 
on the fundamental assumption that it is in the Indian child’s best interest 
that its relationship to the tribe be protected.”315 Accordingly, any 
application of the biology plus standard in the context of ICWA must 
adhere to the best interest principles inherent in ICWA, not those 
seemingly followed by the Court in its unwed father cases.316 
 
First, it seeks to avoid the placement of a child with an individual who is unfit. 
Second, it seeks to choose among otherwise fit individuals. It applies essentially 
middle class values to determine what setting will serve to protect the child from 
physical and emotional injury on the one hand and to a [sic] better the child 
physically, emotionally, and educationally on the other. While racial, ethnic, and 
religious factors may play a role in determining placements, they are secondary in 
importance. Finally, the best interest test, in its modern formulation, relies on a 
number of psychological factors such as the concept of the psychological parent 
. . . . 
Dale, supra note O, at %OP-O_ (footnotes omitted). The “psychological parent is not 
necessarily a biological parent, but is the person to whom the child feels an emotional 
attachment.” Carriere, supra note W$P, at O#_. This standard is in line with “[m]odern family law 
[which] proceeds from the dismantling of the system designed to insure that children would be 
raised by their genetic parents.” June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the 
Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Uncertainty, ## WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. #X##, 
#XWX (WXX%). 
310 Dolgin, Family Arbiter, supra note W#_, at %$O. 
311 Sylvain, supra note #]#, at _]# n.YW. 
312 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, %W# U.S #$_, #OO (#Y]]) (“It is cardinal with us that 
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”). 
313 W$ U.S.C. § #YXW (WX#W). 
314 See Bo Eskay, Review, H.B. cSlg—Codifying a Shift in Social Values Toward 
Transracial Adoption, W_ ARIZ. ST. L.J. P##, P%W (#YYO) (“Cultural extinction may represent the 
one circumstance in which value preferences distinct from a particular child’s interests are 
weighty enough to override the best interest standard.”). 
315 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, ]YX U.S. %X, $X n.W] (#Y_Y). 
316 This break with the traditional best interests standards is consistent with a growing body 
of commentary which has developed in critique of the best interests standard in recent years. See 
generally Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child 
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In those cases, the Supreme Court has never explicitly identified the 
point at which a biological father’s due process rights can no longer be 
invoked to establish legal paternity.317 However, the Court’s decision in Lehr 
demonstrates that no constitutionally protectable right attaches to an unwed 
father–child relationship where the unwed father is contesting the paternity 
claim of another, does not seek to formally establish that relationship until 
two years after the child’s birth, and has not previously developed a 
substantial relationship with his child.318 Still, a degree a flexibility is 
essential because “[t]he precise parameters of the relationship between a 
biological father and a child vary with each case, and circumstantial 
differences necessarily affect the case’s outcome.”319 Accordingly, the 
ability of an unwed father of an Indian child to satisfy the minimum 
constitutionally sufficient standards of parenthood and of § #YX%(Y), hinges 
on his ability to “grasp[]” the “opportunity” for childrearing which he gains 
by way of his biological connection to his child and “accept[] some measure 
of responsibility for the child’s future.”320 The degree to which a putative 
father of an Indian child has grasped that opportunity must ultimately be an 
individualized inquiry grounded in the constitutional principles of the 
unwed father cases and the goals of the Act.321 
 
Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year Experience with the Primary 
Caretaker Preference, P$ MINN. L. REV. ]WP, ]YY-$XX (#YYX). 
317 In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, however, the Court 
did give constitutional sanction to the State of New York’s decision that eighteen months was 
the point at which “foster care begins to turn into a more permanent and family-like setting 
requiring procedural protection.” ]%# U.S. _#O, _$]-$$ (#YPP). 
318 See supra notes #_X–#YO and accompanying text; see also Meyer, supra note #]W, at #WY 
(“[T]he ability of unwed fathers to establish their paternity today often depends upon whether 
they took prompt action to assume legal responsibility for their children or instead dawdled 
while others changed diapers and bought formula.”). 
319 Sylvain, supra note #]#, at _%_. 
320 Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_, WOW (#Y_%). 
321 Notably absent from this construction of a workable constitutional standard in which 
to situate unwed fathers’ acknowledgment or establishment of their paternity is a focus on their 
children’s views and perspectives. In many ways, such a glaring omission models the pre-
Industrial Age era, where the “interests of children were not relevant to determinations of 
custody and parentage.” JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE W#P (#YYP). Modern family law similarly “defines 
parenthood from a curiously adult-centric perspective that gives little currency to the ability of 
children to recognize and claim their mothers and fathers.” Woodhouse, supra note #, at #PY$; 
see also Quilloin v. Walcott, ]%] U.S. W]O, W$# n.## (#YP_) (noting that the child whose adoption 
was at issue had “expressed a desire to be adopted by” the appellee and continue to visit with 
the appellant, but not overtly weighing that factor in its disposition of the case). It is worth 
considering whether the beliefs of a child should factor into paternity decisions under § #YX%(Y). 
Indeed, some may contend that such a consideration should be part of any best interest test. 
This Comment does not endeavor to take up that task or to alter the Court’s biology plus 
framework from its parent-centric perspective. Rather, it installs that framework, as is, into 
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C. The Potential of a Biology Plus § STUV(T) 
In Adoptive Couple, the Court effectively reinforced the Lehr majority’s 
admonition that “the rights of parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities 
they have assumed.”322 But it did so in a way that drastically limited the 
scope of unwed fathers of Indian children’s ability to assume those 
responsibilities, all but ensuring that their untimely invocations of ICWA—
the Court’s so-called “ICWA trump card”323—prove fatal in the absence of 
extant socially or legally paternal ties. Adoptive Couple then, like its biology 
plus forebearers,324 stands for the proposition that the mere capacity for the 
production of a paternal relationship between a child and his biological 
father is insufficient for ICWA’s benefits to attach to the claim of an unwed 
father. 
The application of the biology plus standard to “acknowledged or 
established” would not alter the outcome of Adoptive Couple, where the 
Court assumed arguendo that Biological Father was a parent for purposes 
of the Act. The Court’s determination that Adoptive Couple were “the only 
parents [Baby Girl] had ever known” was central to its holding and 
effectively foreclosed Biological Father from asserting a superior paternal 
right despite his biological ties.325 Even with a more lenient definition of 
“parent,” following Adoptive Couple an unwed father would need to 
demonstrate the “continued custody” which the Court viewed as necessary 
to invoke § #Y#W(f)326 and prove that “the breakup of the Indian family” 
would occur to assert the “active efforts” requirement under § #Y#W(d).327 
But defining “acknowledged or established” remains essential beyond 
the particular provisions considered by the Court in Adoptive Couple. An 
unwed putative father’s status as a “parent” under the Act is salient for 
 
ICWA. The Act does, however, permit the consideration of the Indian child’s preferences in 
adoptive, foster care, and preadoptive placements. W$ U.S.C. § #Y#$(c) (WX#W). 
322 Lehr, ]O% U.S. at W$P. 
323 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, $PX U.S. O%P, O$O (WX#%). Concerns that requests for 
compliance with ICWA by putative fathers are used to unnecessarily delay child custody 
proceedings have also been evinced by state courts. See, e.g., In re R.E.K.F., OY_ N.W.Wd #]P, 
#$# (Iowa WXX$) (“[W]e share the State’s concern that a party might wrongly attempt to use the 
tribal notice provisions of the Iowa ICWA as a delay tactic . . . .”). Despite these concerns, the 
Act itself provides for the delay of state court child custody proceedings upon the involvement 
of a parent, Indian custodian, or tribe of the Indian child. W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(a) (WX#W). 
324 See Dallas, supra note #]X, at %_] n.Y% (“Where the putative father has not first 
developed a relationship with the child, current Supreme Court doctrine gives him no right to 
claim access to her; potential relationships between biological parents and children are not 
protected.”). 
325 Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O]#. 
326 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(f) (WX#W). 
327 Id. § #Y#W(d). 
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notification of involuntary state court proceedings,328 appointment of 
counsel,329 the validation of consent to foster care placement,330 the 
withdrawal of consent during adoption proceedings,331 the potential 
consideration of preferences in adoptive, preadoptive, and foster care 
placement,332 the return of a child following an “improper[]” removal,333 
and for determinations of Indian custodianship.334 Indian custodians, in 
turn, can assert many of the same rights as parents under ICWA. 
The incorporation of biology plus principles into state courts’ 
interpretations of “acknowledged or established” would align § #YX%(Y) 
with the Supreme Court’s requirements for paternal rights to gain 
constitutional sanction. This could assuage a Court uncomfortable with the 
specter of a § #YX%(Y) unmoored from traditional modes of paternity 
establishment. As such, ICWA’s definition of “parent” would be brought 
into the fold of a broader subset of caselaw with which its parameters could 
be defined. 
Most importantly, a biology plus interpretation of § #YX%(Y) would ease 
the interpretive tensions experienced by state courts struggling to grapple 
with an ambiguous provision of a substantial federal law. The Court’s 
reticence to get involved in resolving ICWA interpretive splits among state 
courts has left the courts with little in the way of meaningful guidance by 
which to resolve those splits. The biology plus case law could rectify that 
 
328 Id. § #Y#W(a) (“In any involuntary proceeding . . . where the court knows or has reason 
to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or 
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent . . . of the pending 
proceedings and of their right of intervention.”). 
329 Id. § #Y#W(b) (“In any case in which the court determines indigency, the parent . . . shall 
have the right to court-appointed counsel in any removal, placement, or termination 
proceeding.”). 
330 Id. § #Y#%(a) (“Where any parent . . . consents to a foster care placement . . . such consent 
shall not be valid unless executed in writing and recorded before a judge . . . and accompanied 
by the presiding judge’s certificate that the terms and consequences of the consent were fully 
explained in detail and were fully understood by the parent . . . .”). 
331 Id. § #Y#%(c) (“In any voluntary proceeding for termination of parental rights to, or 
adoptive placement of, an Indian child, the consent of the parent may be withdrawn for any 
reason at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination or adoption, as the case may 
be, and the child shall be returned to the parent.”). 
332 Id. § #Y#$(c) (“Where appropriate, the preferences of the Indian child or parent shall 
be considered . . . .”). 
333 Id. § #YWX (“Where any petitioner in an Indian child custody proceeding . . . has 
improperly removed the child from custody of the parent . . . or has improperly retained custody 
after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of custody, the court shall decline jurisdiction 
over such petition and shall forthwith return the child to his parent . . . .”). 
334 Id. § #YX%(O) (“‘Indian custodian’ means any Indian person who has legal custody of an 
Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to whom temporary physical care, 
custody, and control has been transferred by the parent of such child.”). 
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by imbuing § #YX%(Y) with well-established principles created for the sole 
purpose of determining the types of paternity issues implicated by the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Family relations remain a vital part of the fabric of modern society.335 
ICWA represents Congress’s contention that American Indian family 
structures belong within that fabric as well. In many ways, the Supreme 
Court’s biology plus jurisprudence reflects its fear of fatherhood as a 
mercurial state, ebbing and flowing with the dilatory whims of biological 
fathers inconsistently choosing to assert their paternal rights. That 
jurisprudence began with a large grant of protection to fathers like Peter 
Stanley, but was later winnowed to include almost exclusively fathers like 
Peter Stanley. But in the course of that narrowing, the Court emphasized 
principles of paternity which have reshaped family law and situated 
fatherhood firmly within American jurisprudence. Extending that scope to 
include ICWA has the benefit of clarifying an otherwise obscure provision 
and reifying ICWA’s place within the tapestry of American family law. 
 
335 See Moore v. E. Cleveland, ]%# U.S. ]Y], $X%-X] (#YPP) (“It is through the family that 
we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”); 
McCartney, supra note ]_, at $]O (“The family is the primary means by which a culture is 
transmitted, and is the most important influence on the development of culture.”). 
